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
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THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES: AN EXERCISE IN SOLIDARITY

ARTHUR HUCK*

AMONG WESTERN OBSERVERS of China one of the most popular occupations is searching for signs of conflict between the Communist leaders. It is a difficult and not very rewarding task in view of the strict adherence of members to the Party Constitution.¹ The Party naturally abides by the principle of Democratic Centralism. As outlined in Article 19 this ensures that Party decisions are carried out unconditionally, individual members obeying the Party organization, the minority obeying the majority, lower organs obeying higher organs. Article 26 continues: '... once a decision is taken by the leading bodies of the Party, it must be accepted. ... On policy of a national character, before the central leading bodies of the Party have made any statement or decision, departmental and local Party organizations and their responsible members are not permitted to make any public statement or make decisions at will, although they may discuss it among themselves and make suggestions to the central leading bodies.' This is reinforced in the list of members' duties (Article 2) of which the tenth is 'to be constantly on the alert against the intrigues of the enemy, and to guard the secrets of the Party and the state'. That could hardly be clearer. There is not going to be any evidence of conflict revealed gratuitously.

Nevertheless, despite the difficulties and the meagreness of the signs² the search continues.³ A particularly favoured form of inferred clash is that between the Dogmatic Theorists and the Pragmatic Realists. In the top levels of the Party, it is held, there are

1. Constitution of the Communist Party of China. *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Volume I, *Documents*, pp. 137-168. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1956.

2. c.f. Michael Lindsay, 'What We Know and Don't Know about China', *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March, 1959, p. 21: 'To obtain political information one needs skill at catching hints given in Communist jargon and what is not said is often as important as what is said. For example, one can sometimes deduce a disagreement within the Communist leadership from the fact that some leaders avoid any mention of a policy which others are supporting.'

3. See, for instance, R. MacFarquhar, 'Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXI, No. 4, December, 1958, pp. 323-335.

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some rabid, dogmatic Marxists who are prepared to push through any programme if it accords with rigid Marxist theory and some men of sense who are prepared to recognize facts for facts and make rational adjustments in policy to suit actual conditions.

On the face of it, the recent history of the movement to establish People's Communes appears to give indications of some such clash. The Political Bureau's 'Resolution on the Establishment of the People's Communes in the Rural Areas' was adopted by the Central Committee of the Party on August 29, 1958.⁴ It is quite short, as these documents go, about two thousand words, but it makes fairly clear what a Commune should be. Primarily it is formed by merging a number of agricultural co-operatives into one large unit. The size of these will vary, but generally there will be one commune to a *hsiang*. A *hsiang* is the basic administrative unit in the rural areas. In the official translations it is usually rendered as 'township', following American and Canadian usage, where a township is a division of a county which need not actually be settled or have a town within it. This usage can be confusing; it would be better to translate *hsiang* simply as 'rural district'.

This arrangement has obvious administrative advantages: the *hsiang* government and that of the commune can be equated; the *hsiang* committee of the Party becomes the Party committee of the commune and the *hsiang* People's Council (the local level of the Central People's Government) becomes the administrative committee of the commune. When a rural district is very large and sparsely settled, more than one commune may be established in it, but generally a commune will contain about two thousand peasant households. Larger communes, however, are not ruled out. In fact the show-piece of Hsushui in Hopei, where most of the visitors are taken, has, according to C. P. Fitzgerald,⁵ a population near the million mark.

The resolution gives few precise instructions. Experiments are to be made in selected areas in all counties and 'popularized gradually', but the gradualism is not to be infinite; the spring of 1959 seems to be the limit for completion of the mergers. Details of wage systems, reserved private plots of land, share funds, are all left to be worked out later.

4. The official text is available in *Peking Review*, Vol. I, No. 29, September 16, 1958, pp. 21-3.

5. *Nation* (Sydney), No. 8, January 3, 1959, p. 7, where the Hsushui Commune is described as nearly twice the size of the old county of that name. An earlier account in the *Peking Review*, Vol. I, No. 31, September 30, 1958, pp. 21-4, gives the population of the county as 318,000, formed, by August 17, into seven Communes.

Most of the two thousand words are devoted to theory. Some general economic justification is given for the formation of the communes. Large scale agricultural capital construction, it is insisted, involves co-operation which cuts across the boundaries between co-operatives. This is obviously true of water conservancy works and flood control generally. The growth of rural industry is said to demand the transfer of some manpower from agriculture. This seems a backhanded way of saying that the mushrooming of primitive blast furnaces, for instance, will go a long way toward solving the problem of Northern winter unemployment. The main emphasis of the text, however, is on much higher-level propositions. The rising political consciousness of the 500 million peasants, it holds, is being exemplified in the growth of collectivism. Community dining rooms, nurseries, 'happy homes' for the aged, are all fostering collective ideas. But the commune is meant to be much more than a higher-level agricultural co-operative. It embraces industry, exchange, education and military affairs, as well as agriculture, and the overall aim is to have the worker, the trader, the student, the militia man and the peasant merge into one. With these age-old class and social divisions gone, socialism is well on the way and communism itself 'no longer a remote future event'. Admittedly the communes are still run on the purely socialist principle, 'from each according to his ability and to each according to his labour', but as the differences between workers and peasants, between mental and manual labour, and between town and country are eroded, the great principle of 'from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs' will be put into practice. Then the functions of the state will be limited to protecting the country from external aggression and it will no longer play any internal role.

This rather breathless invocation of the Withering Away and the general confident sweep of the resolution were apparently not received with unmitigated enthusiasm in some circles in the Soviet Union. On October 1 *Izvestia* misquoted the penultimate sentence of the resolution: 'It seems that the attainment of Communism in China is no longer a remote future event' as 'the realization of communes in our country [China] no longer appears as something remote'.⁶ Mr Krushev, in an unguarded moment in his long talk with Senator Humphrey, a one-time instructor in Political Science in Minnesota who seems to have questioned him fairly subtly, is said to have described the Chinese communes as 'old-fashioned' and 're-

6. *Izvestia*, October 1, 1958, p. 3. Translation of an article by Po I-po on 'The Great Leap Forward'.

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actionary', a strong term at any time.⁷

But this apparent disagreement as to who is further along the road to Communism is not our main concern. In China, for the three months following the Central Committee's resolution, the press was full of enthusiastic accounts of the extension of the communes to all the great Provinces, and to such unlikely places as the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

The Central Committee adopted another 'Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes' on December 10, 1958.⁸ It starts off bravely by claiming that in the past few months all of the more than 740,000 agricultural producers' co-operatives in the country had been reorganized into more than 26,000 communes. More than 99 per cent of all China's peasant households had joined the communes. Only Tibet and 'certain other areas' (undefined) had not been so organized. The dominant tone, nevertheless, is much less brash than that of the August Resolution. This document is five times as long (closer to 10,000 words) and full of caution and qualification. The extension of the commune system to the cities, which had earlier been enthusiastically greeted, is to be postponed, on the grounds, firstly, that city conditions are more complex than those in the countryside; secondly that socialist ownership of factories, public institutions and schools is already the main form of ownership in the cities; and, thirdly, that 'bourgeois ideology is still fairly prevalent among many of the capitalists and intellectuals in the cities; they still have misgivings about the establishment of communes—so we should wait a bit for them'.

In Section II of the resolution the process of building a completely socialist China is envisaged as taking another fifteen or twenty years. There are 'goodhearted' but 'over eager' people in the ranks who think this is too long but they must understand that 'the socialist system will have to continue for a very long time'. The establishment of the people's communes must not be confused with the ideal of 'ownership by the whole people'. More emphatically, the change from co-operatives to communes is not the same as the change from socialism to communism. The transition from socialism to communism is now said to be 'a fairly long and complicated process of development'.

Section III manages to be optimistic about the growth of industry

7. Extensively reported; see, for example, Senator Humphrey's article in *Life*, February 16, 1959, p. 46.

8. Text published in *Peking Review*, Vol. I, No. 43, December 23, 1958, pp. 10-19.

in the communes. The bugbear of overpopulation, it is claimed, has been routed by the bumper harvests of 1958. The subsequent passage is surprising, and closer, one would have thought, to poetry than to a practical programme for Chinese agriculture: 'In the next several years, local conditions permitting, we should try to reduce the area sown to crops each year to about one third of what it is at present. Part of the land so saved can be used for fallow rotation, pasturage and the growing of green manure; the rest can be used for afforestation, reservoirs and the extensive cultivation of flowers, shrubs and trees to turn our whole land with its plains, hills and waters into a garden.'

Far from there being an overpopulation problem, it is insisted that there is really a shortage of manpower for rural industry, for the production of fertilizer, insecticides, farm implements, building materials; the manufacture of sugar, textiles and paper; the expansion of mining, metallurgy and electric power.

Whether this makes economic or demographic sense it is beyond the scope of this paper to enquire. The detailed economic recommendations in the next section (IV) are, by contrast, quite humdrum. There had already been a significant directive on the wages of commune workers in Section II: these must be increased and 'for a number of years to come must increase at a faster rate than that portion of their income which comes under the heading of free supply'. The scope of free supply, according to Section IV, should not be made too wide, but it is not made clear what items are to be restricted. Some earlier optimistic lists⁹ had included free food, clothing, housing, education, medical treatment, haircuts, baths, theatres, heating; and marriage, childbirth and funeral benefits. Wages are admitted to be lower than in the city. The rural scale has six to eight grades with the highest grade four or more times greater than the lowest. Remittances, from city workers, for instance, to their families in the country, are not to be interfered with.

A key paragraph then tries to define more closely the vexed question of personal property:

'The more socialism develops and the more abundant social products become, the more abundant too will become the means of livelihood allotted to each individual. Some people think that the switch to communes will call for a redistribution of existing property for personal use. This is a misconception. It should be made known among the masses that the means of livelihood owned by members (including houses, clothing, bedding and furniture) and their deposits in banks and credit co-operatives

9. In *Peking Review*; for example, Vol. I, No. 32, October 7, 1958, p. 5.

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will remain their own property after they join the commune and will always belong to them. When necessary, the commune may borrow the surplus housing space of members with their consent, but the ownership still belongs to the owners. Members can retain odd trees around their houses, small farm tools, small instruments, small domestic animals and poultry; they can also continue to engage in some small domestic side-line occupations on the condition that these do not hamper their taking part in collective labour.'

Section V cautiously takes another step back. 'It is wrong', it says, in a memorable sentence, 'to imagine that attention to the livelihood of the masses will hamper production'! People must have a minimum of eight hours for sleep and four for meals and recreation. The working day should be eight hours of actual work and two of study. The other two are presumably in reserve for work during busy periods. No mention is made of the number of work days in a week.

Community kitchens are not made mandatory. Parents may decide whether it is necessary for their children to board in nurseries and kindergartens or may take them home at any time. 'Homes of respect for the aged' are 'for those old people who have no children to take care of them'. New houses must be so built that 'the married couples, the young and the aged of each family can all live together'.

Some very alarming pictures had been drawn in the West of whole villages being destroyed and the inhabitants flung into new barrack-like structures with the sexes segregated.¹⁰ This can hardly have been the universal or even usual case: to have destroyed and rebuilt the housing of over 500 million peasants in a few months would have been beyond the ability of the most doctrinaire cadres. The resolution has a tart rejoinder to American attacks on the destruction of the traditional family system. Did not the patriarchal family disappear long ago in the West, and did not nurseries, kindergartens and workers' canteens first appear in capitalist society?¹¹

Nevertheless it requires no great powers of insight to infer that not everything had gone smoothly in implementing the August

10. See, for example, the article by James Bell in the issue of *Life* cited above.

11. Compare a typical article by Tang Ming-chao in *China Reconstructs*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, March, 1959, pp. 2-5, where Mr Dulles's Confucian statement that 'the venerated graves of ancestors are everywhere being desecrated' (speech to the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, November 13, 1958) is refuted thus: 'Are there no public cemeteries in Britain and the U.S.? Is each person there buried in his own garden when he dies?'

resolution. *Red Flag*, the Central Committee's theoretical journal, had an editorial on September 1 greeting the upsurge of the people's communes. It contained three slogans, 'full of revolutionary spirit: Get organized along military lines, do things the way battle duties are carried out and live collective lives'. 'Would this breed commandism?', it enquired, and concluded it would not. 'Commandism' is the typical defect of working style due to haste; it has been defined as 'the practice of attempting to carry out Party or government work merely by issuing orders or merely by making use of the administrative machinery without taking the trouble to mobilize, organize, educate and convince the masses'.¹² As the whole commune programme is said to have been completed in three months it would certainly be surprising if commandism had not manifested itself.

In Section VI of the resolution the emphasis on the militia is toned down. Section VII affirms that 'Kuomintang and bourgeois styles of work which coerce the masses are strictly prohibited'. Some cadres, it is admitted, have exhibited 'rude attitudes'. A rather vague warning is then sounded against the tendency to 'exaggeration'. Section VIII, finally, is devoted to a programme of 'checking up on the communes'. From December, 1958, to April, 1959, first secretaries of the Party at the provincial, regional and county levels are to organise large inspection teams for this work. Leading personnel, after serious self-criticism, are to 'mobilise the masses with great daring to air their views freely and frankly. . . . Those who have committed errors but are willing to correct them should be criticised seriously but treated with leniency. The masses should be mobilized to purge the leadership in the communes of those alien class elements who have smuggled themselves into the leadership and the very few who display a very bad style of work and have never corrected their errors even after being repeatedly admonished.'

In the absence of any independent mass survey it is hard to tell what this programme would mean in practice. But the implication is clear enough: it is time to reduce in some degree the collective pressures on the rural population. Given this uneasy shifting in policy it will not be surprising if different observers continue to give different accounts of what communes are like. The difficult business of balancing 'Individuality in the Collective'¹³ will certainly tax the wits of all the cadres, and actual conditions may be expected to vary widely from place to place.

12. Quoted in P. S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today* (Thames and Hudson, 1957), p. 134. Source not given.

13. The title of a short article on personal freedoms in the Communes. *Peking Review*, Vol. II, No. 3, January 20, 1959, p. 4.

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Is it reasonable to infer from this far from tidy story any conflict within the higher leadership of the Party? In the Dogmatic Theorists versus Pragmatic Realists construction it is usual to identify the leaders of the rival groups as Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai. In this case, however, it is difficult to point to any clear identifying evidence. Chou, the alleged pragmatist, in his 'Report on the Work of the Government' to the First Session of the Second National People's Congress,¹⁴ says all any enthusiast could be expected to say on the growth of communes. At the same time the check-up programme is described as having strengthened the administrative system and improved the working style of the cadres.¹⁵

But more generally, surely it is naive to infer that because policy *a* is succeeded by modified policy *b* then a person *B* must have defeated a person *A*. The fact is that the inner group of the Party in China is extraordinarily close knit. Since Mao's leadership was confirmed in 1935 there has been only one major purge, that of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, which was revealed in 1955.¹⁶ The central organization consists of a small group of men unswervingly loyal to Mao, the hierarchy of the Eighth Central Committee being as follows: Chairman, Mao Tse-tung; Vice-Chairmen, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, Lin Piao; General Secretary, Teng Hsiao-p'ing; Standing Committee of the Political Bureau: Mao, Liu, Chou, Chu, Ch'en, Teng, Lin.¹⁷ If any conflicts arose in this group they would undoubtedly be resolved under Mao's chairmanship before any public move or announcement was made. There would not necessarily be even any feeling of discomfort. Mao has always insisted that Marxism is not dogma, that (and this has always been the 'correct' view) it is a set of principles which serve as a guide to action. The contradiction between theory and practice is held to be thoroughly un-Marxist: one must theorize at careful, exhaustive length, but theory must always be tied to practice. If the concrete conditions of China require constant changes in the application of principle that is only to be expected. Mao has constantly reiterated this theme: 'Marxism', he wrote in 1938, 'must be integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and given a national form before it

14. *Peking Review*, Vol. II, No. 16, April 21, 1959, pp. 8-27.

15. As above, p. 17.

16. Kao, a member of the Political Bureau, is reported to have committed suicide in 1954 following his exposure. Jao, who was Director of the Organization Department, was expelled. Kao was accused of trying to make the North East (Manchuria) an 'independent Kingdom of Kao Kang' (Tang, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-2) and Jao of supporting him.

17. Listed after the 5th Plenum by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong, in *Current Background*, No. 513 (Revised), July 16, 1958.

can be put into practice . . . it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism in the specific circumstances of China'.¹⁸ Robert Payne quotes a more pungent passage: 'There are people who think that Marxism is a kind of magic truth with which one can cure any disease. We should tell them that dogmas are more useless than cow dung. Dung can be used as fertilizer.'¹⁹ In short, in the Maoist view, there is no such thing as a purely theoretical solution of a problem: problems are solved by applying theory to concrete situations. Any other way would be un-Marxist.

I am not, of course, arguing that conflicts cannot arise in the higher levels of the Party. It is quite likely that they do and that genuine arguments occur. But modifications of policy cannot be taken as evidence that a clash *must* have occurred. It is equally possible, and, given the party set-up, *just as undemonstrable*, that after an amicable discussion it was decided that events showed that a certain amount of modification of policy was required. The members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau can be imagined as rephrasing their resolutions in equally correct terminology and congratulating themselves on being good Marxists and good Maoists.

Radical changes in the composition of the inner group, another Kao-Jao purge for instance, would, admittedly, be evidence of serious conflict. In such a case the failure in internal solidarity would, as Wittgenstein might have said, show itself. The current changes in the state (as opposed to Party) positions²⁰ show no such tendency. Chou continues as Premier. Chu, who had been Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic, moves into Liu's position of Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Liu has been appointed Chairman of the Republic in place of Mao, who had made it clear that he wished to stand down, while remaining Chairman of the Party.²¹

In the authorized version of the origin of the Communes,²² Chair-

18. Report to the 6th Plenary Session of the Central Committee (Sixth National Congress), October, 1938. *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 260 (Lawrence and Wishart, 1954). Compare the paper 'On Practice: on the Relation between Knowledge and Practice—Between Knowing and Doing', July, 1937. *Selected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 282-297.

19. Robert Payne: *Mao Tse-Tung* (Secker and Warburg, 1951), p. 270. Source not given.

20. New China News Agency, report of April 28, 1959.

21. 'Decision Approving Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Proposal on Chairmanship'. Resolution of Central Committee. *Peking Review*, Vol. I, No. 43, December 23, 1958, p. 9.

22. *Peking Review*, Vol. I, No. 31, September 30, 1958, pp. 21-2.

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man Mao went down to Tazukechuang in Hsushui County, Hopei Province on August 4 of last year to inspect the trial commune which had been spontaneously formed there at the suggestion of the local Party. He was very impressed and the movement quickly spread. Whether this picture is a little simplistic or not, Mao has undoubtedly been identified with the commune movement from the beginning. As things are, this means that, whatever modifications may in fact be made, the Party will continue to support the whole scheme as unvaryingly brilliant.

GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES IN INDONESIA

J. D. LEGGE*

A DESCRIPTION OF constitutional arrangements can, at best, give only an approximate reflection of the way in which political power is actually exercised in any society. In Indonesia the gap between the forms and the reality is particularly wide. During the last few years procedures of government have fashioned themselves with only the loosest relation to the formal machinery of the provisional constitution—so much so that if the Constituent Assembly had succeeded in drafting a paper constitution for the country, it would have had to contend with a functioning system of decision making, which had developed empirically and which could not simply be brushed aside to make way for a new system drafted in isolation in the cooler atmosphere of Bandung. But there are limits to the flexibility of a constitution. When pressure was renewed for the fuller realization of Soekarno's concept of Guided Democracy towards the end of 1958, it quickly became clear that his proposals no longer involved mere improvisation as had been the case in 1957, but that they could only be realized through some measure of constitutional revision.

It will be remembered that Soekarno's original Guided Democracy plan, enunciated at the beginning of 1957 during a period of gathering crisis, called for the establishment of a Government representing all four major parties, including the Communist Party, and for the creation of a National Council representing not parties but functional groups in the community—workers, peasants, religious groups, youth movements, women's organizations, etc. The exact part to be played by the Council was not made clear by the President, but in view of his earlier criticisms of political parties, and his wish, expressed a few months earlier, that they should 'bury themselves', it seemed likely that he really desired a body which would supersede parliament itself. On this occasion a rather rough compromise was secured. Soekarno's proposals triggered off a series of regional revolts (if the term is not too strong) by military commanders in Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Sumatra. On March 14 the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government resigned and the President proclaimed a state

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of war and siege—a move which had the effect of legalizing the action of regional commanders in taking control of administration in their respective provinces. The political vacuum was eventually filled by a Government formed by Soekarno himself, under the premiership of Dr Djuanda, formerly Minister of Planning in the Ali Government. Theoretically, the new Government was a non-party government, though its members represented a wide variety of political points of view. Masjumi had refused to allow its members to join, but the Nahdatul Ulama and the Nationalist Party were both represented. Though there was no actual Communist Party representation, two members belonged to the Partai Murba, the National Communist Party, and others were regarded as fellow travellers. Even so, the Government bore little resemblance to the four-legged Government originally proposed by Soekarno. The subsequent establishment of a National Council (*Dewan Nasional*) based on functional representation was also, it would seem, not quite what Soekarno had desired.

The method by which the new Government was formed (President Soekarno commissioned Citizen Soekarno as cabinet formateur) was sufficiently irregular to evoke charges in some quarters that it was unconstitutional. This view was taken, for instance, by Masjumi. It was significant, however, that at no time did the Government have to face a direct challenge from Parliament, and, in fact, it has been able, on the whole, to secure the passage of its legislation. Parliament, in effect, was careful not to test the constitutional issue, and formally speaking, therefore, it could be claimed that, though the Government was a non-party Government, it had shown itself to possess the confidence of Parliament. The same sort of point could be made about the National Council. It was important that the Council owed its existence to an Emergency Act subsequently accepted by Parliament, and its creation thus did not infringe existing constitutional procedures—the procedures of 'ordinary' as opposed to 'guided' democracy. The Law which created it also limited its powers. It could give advice to the Government, solicited or unsolicited, but this did not affect the formal responsibility of Cabinet to Parliament.

The proceedings and the decisions of the Council are secret, although the substance of discussions and of recommendations has sometimes leaked through to the public. This curtain of privacy makes it very difficult to assess its effectiveness, but it is known that its advice is by no means always followed. In the case of last year's Foreign Investments Act, for example, the Government (and Parliament) disregarded the Council's views. In the contentious field of

regional autonomy, too, it would seem that the Government, whatever its own views, has not been prepared to face the parliamentary hostility which might have been expected to greet the rather conservative and paternalistic recommendations which the Council is believed to have made. Of course, the Council could not have been expected to remove major differences of opinion on major matters.¹ Still it has not been a negligible force. It can serve as a useful forum for the sort of discussion which party rivalry in Parliament might prevent. Opposing views can be tested there without committing their exponents, and compromises may conceivably be worked out in this way. Its existence has been accompanied by some loss of prestige and power for Parliament and the parties, even though the formal outlines of party power remain unchanged.

A more important encroachment on parliamentary and party power during the same period was made by the Army. Again it was an encroachment in fact, but not in form. At the end of 1957 a new State of Emergency Law was passed to replace the existing Dutch measure under which Soekarno had declared a state of siege and war in March of that year. The state of emergency itself was extended by Parliament for a further year. Early in 1958 the formation of the 'Revolutionary Government of Indonesia' and the revolt in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi marked the climax in the continuing conflict between centre and regions. In spite of the defeat of the main rebel forces in a comparatively short space of time, the state of emergency was renewed for a second time at the end of 1958.

While the Emergency Law conferred wide powers on the Army Chief-of-Staff, and on his regional commanders in the several Military Regions of the country, the exact character of the impact of military upon civil administration is not easy to determine either at the central or the regional level. Even if ultimate decisions rested with the military authorities, there were many matters with which those authorities have not bothered to concern themselves, and others on which they have refrained from testing their power. The Army is not in any case a monolithic structure: the Chief-of-Staff is not able to rely with certainty upon the obedience of his regional commanders, and his own position must be regarded as involving the need to compromise and to conciliate subordinates. There has been

1. The Council attempts to reach general agreement by talking matters through, and it avoids the technique of the straight vote. Even within the circle of its own deliberations, therefore, it may well be that differences of opinion have been masked. And one may guess that the weight of authority of the Army's Chief-of-Staff, or of the Premier, or of the President himself, may silence doubters. The workings of the Council are discussed in an article in the *Far Eastern Survey*, July, 1958, 'Indonesia's National Council: First Year' by its Vice-Chairman, Roeslan Abdulgani.

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a broad co-operation between civil and military authorities at the provincial level, but no detailed military intervention in daily civil administration. And, of course, the successive extensions of the state of emergency have been the work of Parliament itself.

However, as with the National Council, the preservation of the existing forms of parliamentary sovereignty meant little if the substance of power was in fact being transferred elsewhere. The very submissiveness of Parliament to the Djuanda Cabinet might be interpreted in terms of the fear that Parliament's formal sovereignty could only be retained if it was not exercised. Be that as it may, the consequence was a weakening in Parliament's position in fact if not in theory, so that the political parties which composed it were in a much less advantageous position to resist when, towards the end of 1958, a new attack was made upon their right to exist.

The new attempt to realize the essential principles of Guided Democracy was launched by the President in his speech on the anniversary of the Revolution on August 17. The new plan involved two main points—the establishment of a National Planning Council composed of technical experts, economists, military representatives and regional and also group representatives to prepare a blue-print for a developmental programme (steps had already been taken in that direction) and the introduction of the principle of functional representation not merely into an extra constitutional body as was the case with the National Council, but actually into Parliament itself. In the August 17 speech the latter point was not made. Soekarno referred briefly to the draft legislation which had already been prepared to create the National Planning Council. On the political side he again criticised the evils of party politics and argued that parties were used, not as a means of preserving the interests of the people, but for sectional purposes. He appealed for a new electoral law, and a law to control party activity; these together would enable the 'simplification' of the party system by reducing the number of parties. He also appealed to the Constituent Assembly to finish its work quickly, but he gave no clear indication of the lines on which he desired that body to proceed.

Up to this point, then, a revision of the electoral law was the major change proposed. The issues at stake were clarified somewhat in the following month when Roeslan Abdulgani, the Vice-Chairman of the National Council, addressed a Ministry of Information service conference, and attempted to give a slightly more specific indication of what would be involved in realising Guided Democracy. With the successful passage of the legislation for the establishment of a National Planning Council, the National Council, he said, was now

concentrating its thoughts not merely on the question of simplifying the party system as suggested in the President's speech, but on the further question of how to alter the composition of Parliament itself by introducing the principle of functional representation. This was the most radical proposal to be advanced so far. He went on to outline four possible routes to Guided Democracy involving ascending gradations of severity. They ranged from the idea that parties should measure up to certain conditions before being permitted to engage in political activity, to the more drastic suggestion at the other extreme that Parliament might have to be dissolved by the President acting under his emergency powers, and a new Parliament formed based on functional groups. This speech, with its hint of forceful measures, at least placed the question of constitutional modification squarely in the picture. In succeeding months discussion of this issue was conducted on a number of levels. In December and January, three 'Open Talks' were held between the President and Cabinet at which were discussed procedures for modifying Parliament's composition, and ticklish questions of detail such as the proportion of members of Parliament who were to represent the groups as distinct from party representatives, and the method of selecting the representatives. At the same time, the idea of a return to the Constitution of 1945 was openly canvassed. Finally, on February 19, Cabinet decided to adopt the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution and of amending the electoral law to allow functional representation in Parliament.

As a means of meeting constitutional difficulties, the 1945 Constitution was more flexible in character than the provisional Constitution. One of its most important features was that it provided for a Presidential Cabinet—i.e., a Cabinet formed by the President and responsible to him, though possibly with a separate Premier. (The relevant clause stated that the President would be assisted by Ministers of State.) Such a Cabinet could not be displaced by a simple Parliamentary non-confidence vote.²

The Cabinet decision posed certain issues clearly. First of all, it

2. The Constitution, in addition to provision for a Parliament, Cabinet, President, etc., provided also for two additional bodies: a general consultative assembly composed of Members of Parliament and representatives of regions and groups. This Assembly had power to choose the President and Vice-President, as well as other vague powers of decision. The second had power to give advice to the President. The former body was described in the Constitution as an executor of the people's sovereignty, and was presumably expected to carry more prestige than Parliament itself. In drawing his authority from this body, the President, of course, had a separate mandate distinct from that on which Parliamentary authority rested.

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was not within Cabinet's power to revert simply to the 1945 Constitution, or to change the composition of Parliament. Its proposal to do so still depended on the approval of the existing representatives of the people—i.e., members of political parties in Parliament and the Constituent Assembly. If the contemplated changes in the Electoral Law were to be secured Parliament would have to amend the existing Act. And if there were to be a revival of the 1945 Constitution, the Constituent Assembly would first have to adopt that Constitution. (It was subsequently announced that the President himself would make a direct appeal at a plenary session of the Assembly.) In other words, the parties were being asked to consent to changes which would formally undermine their own authority.

In fact, negotiation with party leaders to secure their quiet acquiescence had preceded the Government's announcement. At the time of writing the extent of their acquiescence is not completely clear, but it would seem that they were not prepared to fall in with the President's wishes in all particulars. They were anxious to keep the number of functional representatives in Parliament down to a third of the total (a half had been the figure mentioned earlier). And they had successfully insisted on the idea that even these representatives should be elected on party lists. This procedure was embodied as part of the plan outlined by Cabinet after its meeting on February 19, and it represented a defeat for the President on a not inconsiderable point. But according to the Cabinet proposals, the President, aided by an undefined 'national front'³ to be established by Government regulation, was to retain some power of controlling the lists of candidates. The 'national front' also had power to put forward its own list.

It may still be wondered whether changes in formal machinery will materially alter the existing political situation. It may seem that the real shifts in the internal balance of power have already taken place. The Army's role has expanded. Amongst the parties Masjumi's standing has declined, partly as a result of the West Sumatran revolt last year, and N.U. has accepted the idea of the 1945 Constitution in principle. Recent events would appear to suggest an improvement in the President's own political position. The constitutional change may, therefore, merely reflect what has happened. On the other hand, the President has not had it all his own way. In any case the recent discussions and negotiations have been concerned with questions of machinery, not of policy. On questions of

3. Not to be confused with the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian which had been formed by the Army to enable the mobilization of support amongst a variety of social groups at the local level.

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policy there are still wide differences between centre and regions, between parties, and between other groups in the community. The constitutional change cannot automatically supply acceptable leadership, and without such leadership such divergencies are not likely to be resolved. It may well be, therefore, that real power will continue to be spread widely, between a number of authorities and a number of forces—the President, the Government, the Army, Parliament, and the parties—the latter with their own social sources of strength. The exact relationship between these forces has not been clearly defined in the past, and so far has been worked out by a series of adjustments in practice. There have been things the President cannot do and things the Army cannot do. Each has depended upon the other as they have done also upon a degree of agreement with political leaders. It may be doubted whether even a return to the revolutionary constitution, with its provision for strong government, will really change this state of affairs. Indonesia's constitution may thus continue to bear only a loose relation to the actual way in which power is exercised.

April, 1959.

STRAINS IN THE PAN-CONTINENTAL MOVEMENTS OF AFRICA AND ASIA, 1947-58

P. H. LYON*

ONE OF THE most remarkable features of the post-war period has been the reappearance of the formerly ill-fated pan-Asian and pan-African movements and the emergence of a novel and uniquely grandiose pan-bicontinentalism—the Afro-Asian movement. It is difficult to assess the contemporary significance of these continental movements, especially as they are so ill-defined and protean in character, varying in meaning and in strength. Perhaps their recent vicissitudes and salient characteristics are best revealed in an outline account of the relevant continental conferences.

While pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism made no significant impact in the world politics of the pre-war period, in retrospect they may be seen as portents. It is thus worth recalling that the Egyptians, in defiance of cartographic limitations, were among the early proponents of pan-Asianism; that pan-Asianism foundered in the late 1920's because of implacable Sino-Japanese rivalry and was revived as a tool of Japanese aggrandizement; that Kwame Nkrumah was one of the foremost organizers of the fifth of a series of pan-African Congresses all held outside Africa; and that as early as 1920 the Soviet government sponsored a Congress of the Peoples of the East which met at Baku. The Afro-Asian movement lacked even embryonic form in pre-war days.

The history of the three movements in the post-war period is broadly divisible into three phases. The first, and predominantly Asian, phase was inaugurated by Mr Nehru in December, 1945, when he suggested an Asian conference which met eventually in New Delhi in March-April, 1947. Indian leadership was not effectively challenged at first, but increasingly from 1950 hitherto muted inter-Asian quarrels became more strident and prominent. The second, or Afro-Asian, phase was ushered in by the Bandung Conference of April, 1955. Though this meeting was prompted by the enthusiasm of Mr Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia, after the Suez War of November, 1956, the Afro-Asian movement was taken over and led by Colonel Nasser, and Russia soon came to the fore as a leading col-

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laborator. Dr Nkrumah launched the third phase, which overlapped the second, when he convened a conference of independent African states at Accra in April, 1955; pan-Africanism thus became internationally significant as a movement separate from, and in some respects rivalling, the wider Afro-Asian movement.

I

The Asian Relations Conference met at New Delhi in March, 1947, just over four months before India achieved independence. The tone of the conference was set by Mr Nehru in his opening address: '... this conference itself is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of European domination.' He denied that the conference was designed to create 'some kind of pan-Asian movement directed against Europe or America. We have no designs against anybody; ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress all over the world.' But in the next sentence he went on to say: 'For too long we of Asia have been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and to co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others.'¹ Although this unofficial gathering of delegates from twenty-eight different countries was avowedly cultural and sociological in purpose, naturally such a concourse found it difficult to eschew politics entirely, and resentment against Western domination was voiced in many of the speeches that were made. On the other hand, there was a notable absence of any real discussion of Communism and the dangers which it presented, though at that time Russian policy was directed towards undermining the emerging national states of Asia, in particular India, and denouncing their Governments as hirelings of the imperialists. No doubt this omission was due to the presence of delegations from nine Soviet Asian Republics, all tediously able spokesmen for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

While the predominant note was thus basically anti-Western, the conference failed to evoke any strong expression of Asian solidarity. Alarm at the effect of Chinese migration into South-East Asia was plainly expressed; delegates from the smaller countries of Asia showed fear, too, of possible aggression from India, perhaps in an economic and demographic rather than a political or military form; and a delegate from Burma feared that 'European capitalism and exploitation may be replaced by "brown exploitation".'²

1. Asian Relations Conference, 1947. Official Report, pp. 23-24.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

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Notwithstanding these undercurrents, Mr Nehru, in his closing speech, appropriately asked 'whether a similar conference held in Europe—that little continent which quarrels so much—or in the bigger continent of America, with people from so many countries, would have conducted its proceedings with so much amity and goodwill.'³ For, in fact, a common awareness of their difference from Europeans and Americans was about the only Asian-wide unifying factor. The delegates willingly gave a general endorsement to Mr Nehru's view that the most important thing about the meeting was that it was held, thus providing a precedent for further assemblies. But the omens were not auspicious since the survival of its two progeny—a 'permanent' Asian Relations Organization (to nourish goodwill, mutual progress and understanding) and an Institute of Asian Studies—depended from birth on Indian fostering.

The plans for holding a second Asian Relations Conference in China two years later were not realized and there were no subsequent meetings of a like character. Yet undoubtedly the 1947 assembly had marked an important starting point and provided an impetus: the fashion for holding continental conferences had now infected Asia and, following Indian prompting, an All-Asia Buddhist Convention met at New Delhi in May, 1947, and an All-Asian Peasants' Conference at Rangoon in April, 1948.

A second New Delhi conference, again resulting from Indian instigation, marked a first tentative move towards active co-operation between Asian and African governments. In January, 1949, Mr Nehru convened a four-day meeting to consider the renewed Dutch 'police action' in Indonesia. This assembly had quite a different character from the 1947 conference. It was essentially a governmental affair and most of its deliberations took place in private session. Membership was restricted on the Asian side to states which were fully self-governing and which had diplomatic representation in New Delhi, and expanded on the African side to include Ethiopia as well as Egypt (though two independent African states were excluded: remote Liberia and unpopular South Africa). Just to emphasize the obvious fact that Asia, let alone Africa and Asia, was not one, Turkey declined an invitation, while Siam, after at first refusing, allegedly because of opposition to the likely formation of an Asian bloc under Mr Nehru's leadership, eventually sent observers to the meeting. The Philippines also sent only observers.

The conference condemned Dutch military action against the In-

3. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

Indonesian republic and made a number of recommendations to the Security Council. Another, smaller, meeting to re-consider the Indonesian situation was held in New Delhi in April, 1949; but with the rapid abdication of Dutch authority the need for further consultation vanished. In sum, the achievements of these two Delhi conferences were meagre despite the popular interest and acclaim they had enjoyed. The discussion related entirely to the Indonesian issue. Even so, there was an obvious reluctance to take active measures against the Dutch despite dissatisfaction with the Security Council, and it is to be doubted that these meetings made any appreciable difference to the course of events. Talk, not concerted action, was the hallmark of this effusion of Asian unity, and the sole outcome of the Delhi meetings was an agreement to preserve co-operation in the Indonesian dispute and to explore the possibility of future co-operation within the U.N. framework.

In fact, the Asian movement reached the point of maximum co-operation over the Indonesian question and thereafter inter-governmental consultations were confined to South-East Asian states only. For the next six years there were no tangible signs of an emerging Asian unity, though within the United Nations a number of Arab-Asian states became a recognized, if incoherent, bloc. This was, however, no startling innovation;⁴ only a shared response to the quasi-Parliamentary character of the U.N. and also a partial crystallizing of anti-colonial sentiment. The original champion, Mr Nehru, appeared to have lost interest in, or at least to have become disillusioned about, the prospects of pan-Asianism. In March, 1950, he said that it was impossible to get Asian states to attend a conference against colonialism because it would reveal their separate interests.⁵

The unsuccessful efforts of the Filipinos to enlist a number of Asian states in the anti-Communist cause, petering out in the inconclusive Baguio Conference of May, 1950,⁶ and the heated disagreements of the Colombo Conference of April, 1954,⁷ showed clearly that the Cold War had already deeply divided Asia. Henceforward, the pan-Asian movement was manifested only at unofficial levels. The most noteworthy achievement was the launching of an Asian Socialist movement after a first Asian Socialist Conference

4. See S. S. Hayden, 'The Arab-Asian Bloc', *Middle East Affairs*, May, 1954, pp. 149-157; Harry N. Howard, 'The Arab-Asian States in the U.N.', *Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1953.

5. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. III, part II, p. 1760.

6. *Survey of International Affairs 1949-1950*. R.I.I.A., 1953, p. 35.

7. Sir John Kotelawala: *An Asian Prime Minister's Story*. London, 1956, chapter 15.

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had met at Rangoon in January, 1953.⁸ Subsequently a permanent secretariat and an Anti-Colonial Bureau were established in Rangoon and further meetings were held, roughly at six-monthly intervals. Evidence of Japan's renewed, though no doubt chastened, interest in pan-Asianism was shown by the convening of a first conference of Asian Editors and Journalists at Tokyo in March, 1956,⁹ and a first Asian Textile Labour Conference in November, 1958, also in Tokyo.¹⁰

II

Ironically, the Bandung Conference, and so the Afro-Asian movement, sprang from the unproductive meetings of the South-East Asian Premiers. At the Colombo Conference in April, 1954, Mr Sastroamidjojo suggested that a meeting should be held of the Asian and African members of the U.N. His project met with little enthusiasm at first; but eventually his persistence bore fruit and at the Bogor Conference in December, 1954, which met especially to discuss plans for, and to agree on who was to be invited to, the Afro-Asian conference, the Colombo Powers decided to invite all the independent or nearly independent states of Africa and Asia, irrespective of whether or not they were represented in the United Nations. Only Israel (because of Arab objections), South Africa (because of its racial policies) and North and South Korea were not invited, and only the Central African Federation refused to attend.

The representatives of twenty-eight different governments met at Bandung in April, 1955, to consider problems of 'common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa' and to discuss 'ways and means by which their peoples could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation'. The very fact that such a meeting took place was a striking assertion of the increasing importance of these states in world affairs, but, not surprisingly, such a vast gathering did not in fact reveal a united Afro-Asian front to the world. There was an obvious split between the neutralists led by India and the vocal anti-communists led by Ceylon and Pakistan. The final communique sought to paper over these cracks and the famous five principles of co-existence, (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) peaceful coexistence, were extended to ten principles in such a way as to give approval, despite the objections of the neutralists, to the right of each state to defend itself by entry

8. 'The Asian Socialist Conference of 1953', Saul Rose, *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 2: *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 1 (1957), pp. 75-93.

9. *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*. Vol. 5, 1956, p. 338.

10. *The Times*, November 13, 1958.

into regional pacts if it so wished.

By astute diplomacy, mostly conducted outside the formal business of the conference, Mr Chou En-lai scored the greatest personal triumph. Naturally anxious to present the 'new' China in a favourable light, Chou seemed to be successful in reassuring Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos that China had no aggressive designs on her neighbours, and his openly expressed willingness to settle outstanding problems concerning the nationality of overseas Chinese and to discuss the Formosan question with the United States made a generally favourable impression. Indeed, the approving attitude of the Communists was one of the most notable features. Whereas in 1947 the Asian Relations Conference had been severely criticised by the Communists, in 1955 they preferred to make use of the conference system. In pursuance of their current policy of ostensible moderation and conciliation, they seized the opportunity to impress Asians and Africans with their reasonableness and to stress the points of common interest between Communists and non-Communists in the two continents.

There was to have been a further gathering of the Bandung States in Cairo in June, 1956, but it was called off, allegedly because of the unrest in the Middle East. Despite several suggestions (from China, Burma and Ceylon) for a further official Afro-Asian conference this project has not, as yet, been realized. Nor did further official meetings seem necessary, for with the breaking of the deadlock over admission to the United Nations in December, 1955, newly independent African and Asian states found the way open to membership in the organization and the Afro-Asian bloc duly increased in numbers and importance to become the recognized vehicle of the Afro-Asian movement at the governmental level. In November, 1956, Colonel Nasser was supported by this vocally, if not materially, powerful bloc and this experience probably encouraged the Egyptian leader to become the chief sponsor and dispenser of Bandung spirit.¹¹ Usually with Egyptian encouragement subsequent Afro-Asian meetings were unofficial conferences of Peoples or of groups of specialists.

The students were probably the first to follow the Bandung example of their political leaders and Afro-Asian students' conferences were held in London in May, 1955, and in Bandung in June, 1956. It is difficult to decide whether these meetings were typically student or typically Afro-Asian affairs, for soon after the opening of the 1956 conference the delegates found themselves quarrelling over credentials and procedure; ideological cleavages were evident; and

11. Though as early as March, 1956, one writer at least had foreseen this trend. See: 'Nasser imports Bandoengism', *Economist*, March 24, 1956, p. 649.

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the Egyptian and Communist representatives were accused of making the conference 'a hoax and a farce'. These accusations may or may not have been true but it seems clear that the Egyptians and the Communists, not necessarily in unison, are, for the time being at least, the virtual managers of the Afro-Asian movement. Apart from an Afro-Asian Women's Social Workers' Conference which met in Colombo in February, 1958, under the joint sponsorship of the five Colombo Powers, all subsequent Afro-Asian meetings have convened in the Arab world and Soviet delegates have been among the most prominent participants.

Some of the meetings may have been inspired by the recognised publicity value of a wider name. The Arab professional associations, perhaps with some encouragement from 'official' quarters, seem particularly adept at this art of transmogrification. For example, the Arab Bar Association convened an Afro-Asian Congress of Lawyers in Damascus in November, 1957, while the Arab Ophthalmic Society transferred its usual annual meeting to the higher plane of an Afro-Asian Ophthalmic Conference in March, 1958.

However, between 1955 and 1958 there have been only two meetings comparable in importance with the Bandung assembly. The first was the Afro-Asian People's Conference which met in Cairo, December 26, 1957-January 1, 1958. This was the lineal heir of the Conference of Asian Nations—a Communist front meeting which was convened in Delhi in April, 1955,¹² prior to the Bandung Conference. The preoccupations of the five hundred delegates from twenty-seven independent and fifteen colonial territories were incorporated in the agenda, which included the following subjects: the international situation, imperialism, people's right to self-determination, colonialism, the Algerian problem, racial discrimination, banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons, economic co-operation, cultural exchanges and the situation of women and children in under-developed countries.

During the proceedings Israel's 'aggressive policy' was condemned as a 'threat to world peace'. Afro-Asianism thus chimed with Arab nationalism. Many well known irredentist claims were voiced for general approval: a Moroccan delegate demanded the Ifni enclave; a Japanese delegate asked for the restoration of Okinawa to Japan; a Soviet delegate supported China's claim to Formosa and India's claim to Goa; and a Yemeni delegate demanded the evacuation of British troops from Aden. The three most notable features of the conference all indicated that the actual purpose of the meeting was

12. See *New Times* (Moscow), April 16, 1955, pp. 13-15.

to provide a sounding board for propaganda. First was the speech made by the leading Soviet delegate, Mr A. Arzumanian, offering unconditional economic aid to African and Asian countries. This was a patent expression of the growing Soviet economic offensive in Asia and Africa, though, no doubt, the delegates were not intended to, and probably did not, interpret it in this light. Second, at the end of the meeting, a permanent organization was established to implement the resolutions and recommendations of the conference; to promote and strengthen national branches of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, and to act as a permanent liaison between the various countries. Third, Egyptian efforts to stress 'distinctive' themes of positive neutrality, which would thus implicitly exclude Russia and China, failed in the face of skilful Communist manoeuvring.

The second meeting of importance was the Afro-Asian economic conference which convened in Cairo in December, 1958. Sponsored by the Arab Chambers of Commerce, and not by the permanent secretariat of the Afro-Asian solidarity organization, the delegates met to consider the impact of the European Common Market on Afro-Asian trade; to study ways and means of facilitating transfers of payments between Afro-Asian countries, and of promoting economic, technical and financial co-operation among them; to draw up plans for establishing a central co-ordinating body for Afro-Asian chambers of commerce; and to make recommendations for the creation of an Afro-Asian economic organization at governmental level. After four days of scanty, helter-skelter discussion of these topics a number of pious, non-committal resolutions was unanimously adopted at the final plenary session, including the United Arab Republic's proposal for the creation of an 'Afro-Asian organization for economic co-operation' at chambers of commerce level. In contrast to these agreed formal resolutions political issues reared their heads to reveal the fundamental fissures in the Afro-Asian front. A Filipino delegate strongly opposed a Russian attempt to introduce a political resolution condemning the Western powers and pressed for the inclusion of South Korea and Nationalist China at future meetings; an Indonesian delegate questioned the right of the Russians to be present (they were not at Bandung); and Indian delegates objected to the idea that Cairo should become the permanent centre of the Afro-Asian movement. There is every likelihood that such vexed questions will continue to be sources of contention.

III

Parallel with the latest developments in the Afro-Asian movement

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has been the palpable re-emergence in 1958 of a pan-African movement under the leadership of Dr Nkrumah. During the year two important pan-African conferences convened in Accra.

In April the first conference of independent African States (only South Africa refused an invitation to attend) met 'to discuss the problems of our countries and to take the first steps towards working out an African contribution to international peace and goodwill'.¹³ Only one open dispute marred the proceedings. This was provoked by the uninvited presence of a delegation from the Algerian Liberation Front which requested material and financial help from the independent African states. Although the United Arab Republic campaigned for a resolution requiring the conference to sanction military aid for the Algerian F.L.N., this move was defeated and the adopted resolution on Algeria was a much more watery affair, merely recommending that full publicity and diplomatic support should be given to the Algerian cause. An *Economist* correspondent wryly remarked that 'it has taken the first conference of emergent Africa to demonstrate round one table how variously the independents are already divided' despite the fact that they 'met with one purpose—to agree—and using one argument—anti-colonial morality'.¹⁴ On the whole, this was unfair, for while the expected condemnation of French, British and South African policies and the trumpeting of Bandung and Charter principles were forthcoming, the meeting was infused with much genuine amity, goodwill and moderation. It was agreed that the permanent representatives of the African states at the U.N. would act as a permanent liaison committee; that conferences at an inter-governmental level should be held biennially with the next one at Addis Ababa; and that a People's Conference of all African congresses should be called in Accra in December, 1958.

The All-African People's Conference differed markedly from the April meeting. The unofficial status of the conference made possible wide representation ranging through political and nationalist parties, trade unions, farmers' co-operatives, youth and women's groups, to include leaders in exile of outlawed nationalist parties. Not without justification some observers labelled it 'the agitators' conference'. The combined influence of Dr Nkrumah and his adviser on African affairs, George Padmore, was glaringly apparent in the manifesto and provisional agenda of the conference¹⁵ which avowed that the

13. Dr Nkrumah. *The Times*, April 14, 1958.

14. *Economist*, April 26, 1958, p. 286.

15. *New York Times*, December 5, 1958; cf. George Padmore: *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa*, Denis Dobson, London, 1956; and *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, Nelson, London, 1957, esp. chapter 5.

aims of the meeting were to 'formulate concrete plans and to work out the Gandhian tactics and strategy of the African non-violent revolution in relation to (1) colonialism and imperialism (2) racialism and discriminatory laws and practices (3) tribalism and religious separatism (4) the position of chieftaincy . . . examine the question of irredentism and discuss plans for the regrouping of independent African states on the basis of (1) adjustment of existing artificial frontiers (2) amalgamation or federation of territories on a regional basis (3) the progressive federation or confederation of geographical, regional state groupings into an ultimate Pan-African commonwealth of free, independent, united states of Africa.'

Dr Nkrumah's open espousal of 'Gandhian tactics' of non-violence drew forth much dissent, particularly from the Algerians and the Egyptians. The Ghanaian leader pointedly underlined the divergence between the Cairo-led Afro-Asian movement and the Pan-African movement by omitting any references to the past Afro-Asian conferences. Apparently Dr Nkrumah told intimates that he would ignore Afro-Asian assemblies because he felt that President Nasser had corrupted the principles of non-interference and intruded Asian and Communist influences into African affairs.¹⁶ His warning, in the major opening address, that 'colonialism and imperialism may come to us yet in a different guise—not necessarily from Europe' was cryptic enough to be variously interpreted as referring to Russia, or China, or the United States, or Egypt, depending on the interpreter's predilection. The decision to form a permanent organization with headquarters in Accra, to be called the All-African People's Conference, was scarcely final proof that all are now agreed in following Dr Nkrumah's injunction to 'wipe out imperialism and colonialism from this continent and erect in their place a union of free, independent African States'.¹⁷

IV

The past history of these continental meetings contains virtually all of significance in the movements, for they are ill-developed in organizational form and vague in their programmes. What holds the movements' membership together is much more a matter of shared sentiments than of clearly defined aims and the observer must avoid the temptation to take the agreed proclamations too seriously or the emotions of the participants too lightly. It seems undeniable that the common emotional currents encourage a strongly retrospective

16. *New York Times*, December 10, 1958.

17. *Daily Telegraph*, December 9, 1958.

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outlook, for they stem almost wholly from the past, being a mixture of anti-colonial sentiment, memories of Western domination and very often fear, mostly unrealistic but nevertheless present, that there may be a re-imposition of Western rule over their domains. If the strength of such feelings lessens or moderates, the continental movement tends to lose its identity unless dynamic leadership or some dramatic event can act as a catalyst.

There are undoubted political advantages, domestic and international, in assuming the leadership of a continental movement, for it emphasizes the importance of the leading proponents, giving them the increased status and prestige of an international platform. In the inter-war period when none of the leaders of the movements had attained his 'political kingdom', to use one of Dr Nkrumah's favourite phrases, broad, vaguely formulated programmes, aimed at attracting as wide an adherence as possible, were the obvious tactics. Particularist considerations merged easily in the broad anti-colonialist front, and, as the Communists were also agitating for the liberation of Asians and Africans,¹⁸ liaison with Communist front organizations often appeared expedient. In the post-war world when the leaders of the continental movements are also, and more significantly, leaders of a new state, nationalistic considerations are foremost and the different methods and aims of individual leaders become more obvious. While Mr Nehru and Dr Nkrumah in turn¹⁹ stress their support for non-violent methods in the achievement of their aims, Colonel Nasser and the Communists impose fewer restrictions on their choice of tactics.

Furthermore, it is no coincidence that pan-Asianism reached its high water mark with the achievement of Indonesian independence and has already lost its impetus, while pan-Africanism is an accelerating force and a potent mixture of Arab integral nationalism and Communist revolutionary fervour gives a dynamism to the Afro-Asian movement. The territorial *status quo* in Asia has solidified by comparison with Africa and the Arab world, for remaining pockets of foreign rule are small, lingering fears of a return of Western domination have mostly receded and latent fears of Russian or Chinese expansion obviously cannot prompt a continent-wide concord.

Conditions are very different in the Arab world, where state boundaries are widely regarded as artificial, where there have been

18. George Padmore, *op. cit.*, chapter 16.

19. Dr Nkrumah's recent talks with Mr Nehru, and his statement that 'I am trying to learn much from him' (*India News*, January 3, 1959), aptly illustrated their affinities.

recent short but unwelcome returns of Western troops (Egypt in November, 1956, and Jordan and Lebanon in July, 1958, though the 'visits' were somewhat different in aim and expression) and where, after the default of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, ostensibly as a disinterested friend, is helping to finance the Aswan Dam scheme. In Africa, too, where colonialism is still the dominant issue, immensely complicated by the presence of European settlers, and with the example of the South African Government's apartheid policies before them, there was a poignant truth for many African leaders in the motto of the recent All-African People's Conference: 'We have freedom to attain, a continent to regain.'

Given the extreme fluidity of the Arab-African world, three questions seem pertinent: can such unions as that of Egypt-Syria or Ghana-Guinea be the nuclei of much larger unions? What will be the outcome of the uneasy alliance between the Egyptians and the Russians in the Afro-Asian movement? And will Ghana be able to maintain the leadership of the pan-African movement, particularly after her larger neighbour, Nigeria, attains independence in 1960?

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE, PALMERSTON NORTH, NEW ZEALAND

R. L. STOCK*

THE SIXTH COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE met in January at Palmerston North, New Zealand. To Australians, the New Zealand scene has so many features in common with our own country that the site was hardly a novel one. For most of the other delegations, however, it was a striking fact that they had to make what was almost the longest possible journey to reach the conference place. The significance of this was underlined by the fact that not only did delegations come from established Institutes in countries which were full members of the Commonwealth—United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan—but there were also guest delegates from other parts of the Commonwealth where fully fledged Institutes had not yet been formed. These guests came from Ceylon, East Africa, Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Singapore and the West Indies—some of which had already achieved full membership of the Commonwealth and others had not.

Perhaps the fact that delegations had travelled so far may have helped to give them a greater sense of purpose. The hospitality of the New Zealand Institute, supported by the New Zealand Government itself, and the citizens of Palmerston North, contributed also to the atmosphere of the Conference. It was certainly true that the Conference soon built up a sense of unity amongst its members which made it easier to achieve the real exchange of thought and information which is the purpose of such meetings.

As is always the case with these Commonwealth Conferences, the delegations, even if they included members of parliaments or public servants, were unofficial, proceedings were informal, and there were no precise resolutions. There were reports of discussions, and at times when a consensus of opinion appeared to have been attained, the result was recorded in some statement to that effect. This Conference went rather further than most of its predecessors in this recording of statements. There were some who thought that the tendency went further than desirable, since it might inhibit dis-

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cussion and detract from the informality of the proceedings; there were others who thought that the attempt to work up to such statements helped to crystallize ideas which might otherwise be vague and also to give more permanence and therefore more effectiveness to any conclusions reached.

With such a conference it is especially difficult to evaluate the results. A delegate meets a number of interesting people in a pleasant atmosphere, takes part in discussions, builds up a number of friendly relations with his fellow delegates, and goes away again with a feeling of satisfaction. No positive action directly follows the Conference, nor is it intended that it should.

For any delegate, it is therefore a desirable discipline to ask himself if the Conference, enjoyable though it might have been, did in fact do any good.

Naturally the answer to this question must be an individual one, but the writer's impression is that most delegates would reply in the affirmative.

The unofficial and informal character of the proceedings is in itself a strength. Delegates, even those in the most responsible positions, can exchange ideas, express opinions, and allow their own thinking to be developed by that of others, without direct concern over the effect of these ideas upon narrower political interests in their own countries. The very diversity of the delegates themselves gives a fertile field for the growth of ideas which might never otherwise be created. A New Zealand farmer, an Indian political thinker and politician who had spent some time in gaol in the cause of Indian independence, an East African Chief, a Canadian economist—all examples of the range of the human material in the Commonwealth, of a diversity which is its richness.

The effects of the Conference being indirect, they naturally depend much on the quality of the ideas themselves which emanate from it, and the capacity of the delegates to make those ideas known in quarters where they matter.

The formal subject of the Conference was the structure and function of the Commonwealth—a formidable enough title which covered a multitude of subjects. It is not possible in the compass of this paper to reproduce all that came out of a fortnight's conferring; but it can be said that throughout the discussion there was a search for the factors producing some degree of unity in the Commonwealth and an examination of the factors tending in the opposite direction.

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

On the political and cultural side, the discussion was illuminating,

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but could hardly be said to have produced any single answer to this search for unifying factors. There were many factors which tended in that direction, but none which was universally operative.

An obvious one was the theory and the practice of democratic government with its particular expression in the shape of parliament. The effect of this was examined in some detail. There was no doubt that it was still a powerful force making for unity. It meant that most of the member countries of the Commonwealth organised their political affairs in broadly the same manner and, what was more important, that the patterns of their political thinking were similar as well. However, it was no less obvious that there were now important exceptions within the Commonwealth to the practice of democratic and parliamentary government. The representatives of both Pakistan and of Ghana came in for some questioning on this point. As to the former, it was admitted by them that the full practice of democracy had broken down in the specially difficult circumstances in which Pakistan was placed, and it had been found necessary to establish a military dictatorship as a kind of cleaning-up operation. This, however, was regarded as a temporary phase, although its duration was hard to estimate. From Ghana a similar explanation was given that, in the comparatively immature condition of the country, full democracy was not practicable and for a while at least there must be some greater emphasis on leadership. It was apparent, however, that there were some elements in Ghana which were dissatisfied with this departure from democratic principles.

There was a body of opinion which thought that no less important than the forms of democratic government was the habit of thinking which took for granted the rule of law. Even this mental attitude could hardly be said to be common to all of the countries of the Commonwealth. In the opinion of some it had been modified to some degree in South Africa, where the forms of parliamentary government were still observed.

Language was another factor which was suggested as a significant unifying influence. Not only did it make it possible for the parts of the Commonwealth to communicate in a way which would not otherwise be possible, but it had the even more significant though intangible effect arising out of the fact that language in so many respects determines the pattern which thinking follows. It is the vehicle for the transmission of ideas and, in the course of transmission, moulds them.

Here again there were many who pointed out the limitations of this factor. English was by no means the universal language of the Commonwealth. Indeed in many instances it was the language of

only a very small minority of the population. The independence of some of the new members had brought it about that English-speaking minorities were no longer so dominant as they had been and the local national language or languages were relatively more important than before.

There were other cultural factors such as educational systems and the consideration that many of the leaders of the official classes in the Commonwealth countries had had their training in the United Kingdom. Here again, the factor was one of strength varying very widely from one country to another and certainly not sufficient in itself to be a criterion of Commonwealth unity.

In all these political and cultural trends, the pressure of outside influences was important. Quite apart from what could be called the conflicting influences from the Communist countries, there was the profound effect of the United States. The enormous political, economic and cultural strength of that country was not necessarily opposed to the factors producing some community of interest within the Commonwealth but it did generate a second set of influences.

In so far as one could sum up this part of the Conference, it could be said that there was no one unifying factor which was present throughout the Commonwealth, but there were a number, varying in intensity (even to the point of disappearance), from one country to another, but nonetheless as a whole producing a very material degree of common interest.

RACE RELATIONS AND COLONIALISM

The problem of race relations and the related question of colonialism received much attention. There was a significant change in the emphasis compared with the discussions at earlier conferences. It would be going a great deal too far to say that colonialism was no longer a problem with the Asian members of the Commonwealth. Indeed, in a later discussion about political and strategic factors, it was suggested by an Asian delegate that the first reaction of an Asian country tended to be against the former colonial powers—though there were, of course, other factors which might well counteract that tendency. Yet one did have the impression that, with the independence of Malaya and the growing experience of India and Pakistan as independent nations, and perhaps even the fact that a country such as Burma had left the Commonwealth and gained nothing thereby, the problems which were uppermost for the new Asian members were rather those of internal development. These countries tended to look at the outside world, including the former colonial powers, mainly in relation to these problems of their own growth.

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They were much less concerned than they had been with the past colonial era. That era was a chapter which, if not closed, was looked at much less frequently.

This was not to say that all was well with the Asian members. Ceylon was in a condition of serious disturbance with its political system showing some signs of breakdown, and with its economy similarly threatened and suffering from lack of capital which it was unable to attract because of the uncertainty of its future. India had its enormous development programme—the attempt in face of a tremendous population still growing to carry out an industrial revolution without using the ruthless and authoritarian methods of Russia and China. Pakistan was seeking to make a politically and economically viable proposition out of a country geographically divided and industrially weak. The energies of both India and Pakistan were being sapped by the ever-present tension between the two countries.

All these problems were acute enough, but they were not the problems of colonialism or race.

When one turned to Africa, the picture was very different. That continent may not be so significant in world history or in the Commonwealth itself as Asia, but it is nonetheless of great importance; and there the stage of colonialism was not at an end and the relations of race were still the cause of bitter conflict. The mere presence at the Conference of so many guest members from Africa highlighted this change in emphasis in race problems from Asia to Africa. The African problem takes different shapes in different parts of the continent. In the West African territories, for example, the population is almost entirely black African and the question is the degree to which the peoples concerned are fitted for independence and what form their political system should take when they achieve such independence. In East Africa and in the Central African Federation, this question of the fitness of the black African for self-government is still an acute one, but it is tremendously complicated by the other issue of the survival of a white minority now dominant if it loses its dominance. In the Union of South Africa, both issues have reached a much more advanced stage. The Union has a long history and is already highly developed and the whites, though still a minority, are a very much larger proportion of the total. Furthermore, race relations are made still more complex by the antagonism between sections of the Afrikaans and British whites, by the presence of a half-caste element and by the intrusion of an Indian minority to which black Africans are probably even more hostile than the whites.

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In this context, there was much discussion about the Union Government's 'apartheid' policy. The South African delegates did put up a strong case in defence of it. The strength of this argument was in the exposition of the appalling difficulties of achieving any way out of the present situation. Much evidence was brought to show how far from being fit for participation in government were many elements of the black African population. The white population had a high degree of development and it faced the real peril that if it once lost control it might be submerged or even destroyed by the black majority. It was pointed out, too, that the white population were unlike many other immigrant minorities in that they had no alternative home to which they could return. They were in many respects as indigenous as the blacks, most of whose ancestors were themselves immigrants from further north to what was now the territory of the Union.

The policy of the South African Government was therefore stated to be one of separate development. Emphasis was laid on the developmental side. It was suggested that the black communities could develop no less than the white communities, but separately.

The statement of the difficulties commanded much sympathy from other delegates, but there was less support for what the South African delegates put as the constructive side of the Government's policy. There was much doubt whether the policy of separate development would work in practice. The two types of community could not be isolated. Apart from any other reasons, the black African was an important part of the industrial and commercial economy of the white community. The practical result, therefore, was in many cases that 'apartheid' meant not true separate development, but the subjugation of the black in a common development. This was criticized by some on the ground that permanent racial inequality could not be accepted in terms of human values, and by others on the grounds that, in the every-day conditions of a growing industrial and commercial system, the increasing importance of the black African meant he could not be kept in permanent subjugation.

There was a suggestion that some South African Government measures, regarded by many as extreme, were provoked by un-intelligent and uninformed criticism from outside. Many delegates, however, thought it impracticable to expect that the Government's policy could escape criticism, intelligent or otherwise. A sidelight to the discussion was the statement of the degree to which other Commonwealth countries were embarrassed in international discussions by the necessity to seem to defend or condone actions by the South African Government. The issue was even raised as to whether

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South Africa would withdraw from the Commonwealth because of disagreement over racial policies, but the South African delegates were emphatic that, while the Union Government may consider the setting up of a Republic, it had at no stage suggested a withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

With regard to other Central and West African territories, it appeared that while many white elements had not explicitly adopted the 'apartheid' policy of the Union, their thinking was generally on the same lines of the necessity to preserve the white minority and the unsuitability of the black African to participate in government. Many delegates felt that such an approach to the issues must in the long run fail. It was just not feasible for the tiny white minorities to preserve their complete dominance indefinitely. The only solution appeared to be on the lines of racial partnership, however hard that might be to achieve. The black African had to be admitted to some control of the society in which he was such a large part, even if there should be some safeguard for the special position of the minorities. There was some difference as to whether the black African should be admitted immediately to a fully democratic system, or whether the Africans themselves would have to be divided into the civilized minority who could now be admitted and the uncivilized mass who would have to be educated first. It was recognized that the longer it was before a solution was achieved, the greater the difficulty in proceeding gradually. It was also notable that the advocates of the more gradual method were not necessarily white delegates. Some of the black African members supported it no less.

Quite a remarkable commentary on the whole problem of race relations came from the West Indies, of whose two delegates one was of black origin and the other of white. Both were emphatic that whatever the problems of the West Indies might be, they were not ones of race. There were no racial barriers whatever to participation in political or economic life. The diverse races had been completely integrated into a single community.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Much of the time of the Conference was taken up with economic matters. Once again there was no single factor which bound all the members together, although there were a number which bound together groups within the Commonwealth.

(i) EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

The attitude of the Commonwealth to the European Common Market was a very live question. The Market itself was thought to

be a major step forward in that it removed the impediments to economic activity within one of the most important of the world's economic groups. At the same time, it brought special problems for the United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth. It had been suggested that the United Kingdom could associate itself with the Market by securing the privileges of membership in return for the conceding of free access to its own markets in a European Free Trade Area. This would enable the United Kingdom to preserve its existing relations with the Commonwealth. In spite of earlier optimism the negotiations on these terms had broken down and the United Kingdom was faced with the serious consequence of partial exclusion from the European Market. On the other hand, individual Commonwealth countries were faced with the pressure of the Market to make direct bilateral deals, a pressure which could be very strong in view of the economic power of the Market in relation to such a country as New Zealand, with its balance of payments problem and its dependence on a few primary product exports. The urgency of the matter had been reduced by the fact that the Market countries had extended, pursuant to G.A.T.T., the first of the progressive tariff concessions between themselves to other countries; but this could not be regarded as a permanent solution, since the process might not be repeated.

The general view of the Conference was that it was necessary to have a 'new deal of cards' in the negotiations. The Commonwealth should, as a whole, negotiate with the Market as a whole. Thereby the United Kingdom might be able to reconcile its two roles as a member of the Commonwealth and also as part of the economic system of Europe; and it might be possible for the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth countries to secure benefits in the Common Market, even at the price of concessions in their own tariff and import licensing policies.

There was no point in denying the extraordinary complexity which such negotiations would entail. Imperial preference, for example, might have to be modified and this modification might cost the United Kingdom as much as, if not more than it would other Commonwealth countries. Such concessions might also affect the protection given to the local producers in the individual countries. Special considerations arose in the case of the underdeveloped members such as India which could not, for example, surrender the tight control over its import policy necessitated by its plans of growth with their emphasis on capital imports. Canada too would have to be cautious in making tariff concessions which would reduce the

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effectiveness of its protection against the United States. Australia, perhaps to a lesser degree, might have a similar problem regarding Japan.

All these complexities would make negotiations a major task, but an unwillingness to negotiate as a whole would not enable the individual members to escape the consequence of the Market and would put each member at a disadvantage in such bilateral negotiations as it might be compelled to enter.

(ii) THE STERLING AREA

The future of the sterling area was considered at some length. It was thought on the whole to be an efficient system for pooling the resources of the sterling area in its dealings with the dollar area. There was some suggestion of criticism on the ground that the sterling area provided banking profits for the City of London, but the answer was made that while there might be such profits it was a reasonable return for carrying out the very necessary function of being the central organisation of the sterling system. Some suggestions were made for the improving of the system, such as the setting up of a bank for the Commonwealth, but it was doubted whether by merely creating new institutions beyond the reasonably efficient ones already operating one could add to the resources of the area.

There was some discussion about the effect on the sterling area of inflation in the individual member countries. It was pointed out that sometimes the developmental programme of a member country might have inflationary effects. While such a programme need not necessarily have such effects, it was recognized that on occasions in the past it had.

Import licensing and similar restrictions on the free movement of goods were recognized as undesirable in principle, but it was also recognized that in the state of the economies of some countries such controls were necessary. This was especially the case in the underdeveloped countries where the resources of overseas exchange had to be conserved and directed into the appropriate channels, especially those related to the developmental programmes.

(iii) CAPITAL INVESTMENT

Capital investment was naturally the subject of much attention, particularly in its relation to the underdeveloped countries. Some delegates pointed out that the resources of the Commonwealth in capital were limited, and in estimating what could be invested it should not be imagined that the capital was there for the asking. Other members were critical of this attitude as being too negative. The desperate need of so many countries, India, Pakistan, East

Africa, and indeed practically all the new members, was for capital, and the possibility of settlement of political and other economic problems depended so much on this capital being provided. In so far as a general view was achieved, it could be said that it was appreciated that capital could not be created without work and saving, but that the possibility of creating additional capital and diverting it to areas in need of it had not been fully explored. It was suggested by some from the older members that the possibilities of expansion of the Colombo Plan type of assistance were much greater than some cautious government leaders would recognize.

It was also true that private investment was not a sufficient answer. Naturally private capital was attracted to the area giving the best prospects of reasonable profits and these prospects were often found in the countries, such as the older Dominions, which had already developed a long way, but were still expanding. Much capital assistance would therefore have to be on a government to government basis and it would have to be recognized that in the borrowing country it might have to be used in enterprises which would be of a collective kind.

The point was made that the mere provision of additional capital was not the sole answer for development. As an Australian delegate put it, capital was no magic wand. It had to be properly used. There was much technical knowledge which was needed to go with it—and no less important—it had to be properly administered. Much capital in and outside the Commonwealth had been wasted because of the lack of these requisites.

(iv) ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Throughout the economic discussions, it was realized that the Commonwealth's problems could not be considered in isolation from the United States. In dealings with the Common Market, it might well be that the United States would have to give its support in the negotiations. Obviously, as far as capital was concerned, each member might have to look as much outside the Commonwealth as inside; and the main source of supply must, of course, be the United States. As a British delegate put it, there was nothing disgraceful in such a policy. If a member could secure real help, it was to its own advantage, and that of the Commonwealth as a whole, that it should do so. It could even be a good thing to secure help from the Communist bloc, provided there were not too many strings attached.

FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY

Because of the extensive discussions which took place on these economic matters, consideration of some of the important issues of

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foreign and strategic policy were crowded into the last few hours of the Conference. It was quite obvious, however, that there could be no general agreement among all members of the Commonwealth on many of the major issues of world politics. In the major struggle for power between the two great blocs, India was firm in its policy of non-commitment. This did not necessarily mean complete neutrality, but it did mean that India would not commit itself to approve particular issues in the policies of other members of the Commonwealth, and would certainly not undertake positive measures in support of those other policies, even if it approved of them. It became apparent that the policy of India was based both on the habits of thinking of the leaders of India and their reluctance to participate in a cold and a potential hot war, and also on an estimate of the long-term interests of India in her present circumstances. Many Indian leaders considered that, apart from all other factors, India's problem of development was such that she must concentrate upon it to the exclusion of all other responsibilities.

This picture of concentration was, of course, marred by the degree of energy being spent by both India and Pakistan in their internal conflict. This conflict, in its manifestation over Kashmir and the Indus waters, came to the surface from time to time at the Conference, but no attempt was made at an adjustment in the Conference itself.

In these major questions of strategic and of foreign policy, the best that could be done was to achieve a recognition of the desirability of consultation and discussion and of friendly sympathy. There were some specific issues which were mentioned such as the recognition of Red China. There were those who thought that this should be supported—not as an isolated act, but as part of a package deal over a number of Far Eastern issues. Others preferred to say that the whole question of relations with the Communist powers should be reviewed with the purpose of making the contacts with them smoother.

Looking back at the Conference, it was clear that there was no one unifying factor in economic and strategic questions any more than in political and cultural questions. There were, however, a number of factors which brought into close association one group or another.

This did not exclude the building up of other relations—with the United States on economic and military matters, or with other South-East Asian countries. Such other associations might diminish the importance of the Commonwealth association relatively, but they

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were not otherwise competitive with it and could indeed exist alongside it. The Conference was a meeting of people dealing with an association which was no longer as vital to its members as it had been, but which was still of great significance to their respective futures.

One special and not entirely desirable feature was that in all the associations of groups within the Commonwealth for one purpose or another, the relation was almost invariably between the United Kingdom and one or others of the remaining members. Close relations between two members without the participation of the United Kingdom were unusual. The United Kingdom remained the focal point. Some regarded this as a weakness, although others appeared to think of it rather as the product of the practical requirements of existing associations—a characteristic which might change as those associations developed.

In so far as the Conference could find any general element of unity, it was in the feeling, vague perhaps, but nonetheless important, that for many and indeed differing reasons, the members of the Commonwealth still desired to retain their membership.

In line with this thought was the fact that towards the end of the proceedings at Palmerston North, the Indian delegation announced its invitation for the next Conference to be held at New Delhi—and it did so with the support of the Government of India.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM OF CHINA

M. G. D. MALMQVIST*

ACCORDING TO A statistical investigation undertaken in selected areas during 1953, the growth of the Chinese population has been estimated at 2.2 per cent—or about 14 million individuals—a year. This rapid increase of population has in recent years come to stand out as one of the major problems in Chinese society. In the autumn of 1953 the Chinese Government entrusted the Ministry of Health with the task of propagating knowledge of birth-control. At about the same time it was decided to revise the previously rigid regulations concerning abortion and sterilization and in December, 1954, Liu Shao-ch'i, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, convened a conference to discuss the various aspects of the problem. In his report concerning the second five-year plan, delivered before the Eighth Party Congress in September, 1956, Premier Chou En-lai stressed the need for an intensified birth-control propaganda.

Prior to spring, 1957, the propaganda for birth-control was said to be exclusively conditioned by consideration for the health of mothers and children, the education of children and the economy of the family. It was not until March, 1957—during the first phase of the 'rectification campaign'—that critical voices began to emphasize the serious impact of the rapid growth of the population on the national economy. One of the most important and best documented contributions to the discussion was made by the sociologist, Professor Wu Ching-ch'ao ('On the Chinese Population Question', *Hsin Chien She*, Vol. 3, March, 1957).

Wu Ching-ch'ao points out that a raised production may be achieved either through an augmentation of working staff or through an increase in productivity. Of these two alternatives, the latter would be better suited to a socialist society. An increase in productivity depends upon improved technical equipment, and this, in turn, needs augmented investment in capital goods. As the availability of investments is inversely proportional to consumption Wu Ching-ch'ao concludes that a too rapid increase of population prevents a rapid enlargement of investment.

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During the period of the first five-year plan the average annual investment per worker amounted to approximately Y 13,000. If we take this figure as our starting point we can estimate the number of workers that may be employed within a technically advanced production with the aid of one year's capital accumulation. In 1954 the accumulation amounted to 21.6 per cent of the national income, or approximately 17 milliard yuan. We can then estimate the possible annual increase in the working staff at 1.3 million workers, each equipped with means of production to an average cost of Y 13,000. This hypothetical figure tallies rather well with the estimates of the first five-year plan, according to which 5.36 million workers were employed during the period.

At present the Chinese population is increasing by approximately 14 million a year. At the present rate of capital accumulation, the maximum number of additional workers that can be employed each year without allowing labour productivity to fall is 1.3 million. Any rate of growth of the work force greater than this is bound to depress productivity and real income. This fact constitutes the central problem of the population question.

The question now presents itself whether this is a purely temporary problem, whether it will not be possible with a rising national income to increase the rate of capital accumulation and thus ensure a better balance between the growth of the work force and growth of capital equipment. In answer to this question Wu Ching-ch'ao points out that the experience of other socialist countries, and especially of the Soviet Union, is not encouraging. Technical progress, through automation and other improvements in methods of production, continuously increases the amount of capital equipment needed per worker. This is liable to absorb any increase in the rate of accumulation that becomes possible, leaving no margin for equipping a more rapidly growing work force.

Wu Ching-ch'ao also discusses the question what form the population problem will take when China has realized a Communist society. It will then be a matter of paramount importance for China, as for the Soviet Union, that *per capita* production exceeds that of the capitalist countries. The difficulty of this task may be seen from the following figures: in order to equal the *per capita* production of, for example, electric power, coal, pig iron, steel and cement in the United States during 1955, the 1957 Chinese production of these items would have to be multiplied in the following way: electric power by 142.7, coal 14.3, pig iron 54.8, steel 93.4, and, finally, cement by 31.3 times. Even so, this estimate is based on two unrealistic assumptions: first, that United States' production will

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remain at the 1955 level when China achieves its Communist society, and second, that the population of China at that time will still be only 640 millions.

Apart from Wu Ching-ch'ao, whose arguments have been referred to above, Fei Hsiao-t'ung, Ch'en Ta, Li Ching-han and Ma Yin-ch'u presented similar views on the problem. These prominent scholars were later—during the suppression of the 'rightist opposition'—accused of having tried to undermine the people's confidence in socialist economy in order to pave the way for the restitution of a capitalist society.

During the autumn of 1957 Marxist sociologists and economists entered upon a refutation of the arguments which had been advanced by the intellectual opposition during the previous spring. The earlier and much publicized demand for an elimination, in the shortest possible time, of the technical backwardness of the Chinese economy, so that all industrial workers should be accommodated within a productive apparatus of the highest technical standard, received much less prominence in these discourses. Instead there was a strong tendency towards stressing the need for the establishment of medium and small-sized industrial enterprises with a technically less advanced equipment. Such enterprises, it was said, would possess the following advantages: they would need small investments and short construction time, give quick returns, and offer employment to a relatively large number of workers. The new official policy with regard to industrial development, deriving from this compromise solution and proceeding under the slogan 'co-ordination of large, medium and small enterprises', seems to have partially conditioned the great upsurge of the so-called 'local industry' during the spring and summer of 1958.

It seems as if the unrestricted discussion on the population problem during the first half of 1957 also effected a marked change in the Government's agrarian policy, especially with regard to the previously much publicized mechanization of agriculture. In the twelve-year programme for agricultural development, first published in January, 1956, the 'use of improved agricultural implements and a step-by-step realization of mechanization' were given a prominent place amongst the measures proposed to promote production. In the second and revised version of this programme, published in October, 1957, the wording had been modified into 'the gradual introduction of agricultural implements of a new type'.

In an article published in the *People's Daily* of October 24, 1957, the chairman of the National Technical Commission admitted that the long-range plans for the mechanization of agriculture had been

based on far too optimistic premises. These plans had relied on the experiences of other countries, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, in which countries, because of their relatively limited populations and large farming areas, the prospects for a successful carrying out of such plans were entirely different. The author also pointed out that certain technical aspects of the Chinese situation, such as the hilly farming areas, the wide extension of paddy fields and the lack of petroleum, had not been sufficiently taken into account by the planners. A certain amount of mechanization would, however, be needed in those limited areas where the extension of the double crop system had resulted in a seasonal lack of manual labour.

Another obvious obstacle to the realization of mechanization is the fact that, while mechanization would lead to increased *per capita* productivity, it would not necessarily raise output per acre. In areas other than those afflicted by seasonal labour shortages, mechanization would therefore result in a still more marked labour surplus.

Here, too, it may be mentioned that experiments with State owned tractor stations have apparently been rather unsuccessful. It was therefore not surprising that the Government last year decided to follow the Soviet step in dismantling these stations.

The rapid growth of population has contributed towards an aggravated housing and food supply problem in the cities. During the years 1949 to 1956 the population of Peking increased by 97 per cent, whereas the housing area increased by only 59 per cent. The overcrowding appears to be especially grave in Shanghai, where the housing area per individual amounts to only 2.97 sq. metres. This development is not, however, solely due to the high birth-rate and the industrialization of the major cities. In China, as elsewhere, the flight from the countryside has in recent years come to be a problem of primary importance. It has been officially estimated that about eight million farmers moved to the cities during the period of the first five-year plan. This flight from the countryside appears to be mainly due to the fact that the Government has found it impossible to bridge the wide gap in living standards between the country and city. At times, as during the autumn of 1956 and the spring of 1957, the move to the cities has been directly conditioned by crop-failures and bad harvests.

The new and more rigid regulations regarding food rationing in major cities which were issued last New Year (1958-59) may be indicative of the Government's intention to level out differences in consumption between the countryside and the city.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM OF CHINA

It appears that Wu Ching-ch'ao and other critical scholars were successful—in the few months at their disposal—in convincing the authorities that the immense manpower of the nation was a far less valuable asset than it had formerly been thought to be. The policy changes concerning both industrial and agricultural development carried through in the autumn of 1957 may, at least partially, be due to the outspokenness of the intellectual opposition.

The subsequent development, the launching of a number of large scale production campaigns such as the 'great leap forward movement', appears to have had two main propaganda purposes: first, to demonstrate the alleged political stability and enthusiasm of the masses resulting from the 'victory' over the rightist opposition; and, second, to re-establish, once and for all, confidence in the potential capacity embodied in the country's vast population.

It may be taken for granted that there has been no change in the Government's views on the population problem, and that a drastic reduction of the birth-rate is still felt as an urgent need. What, then, are the measures by which the authorities hope to achieve this end? The intensive birth-control propaganda inaugurated in 1957 appears to have been somewhat overshadowed by the great production campaigns during 1958. There are no signs whatever, though, that it has been discontinued. It is to be expected that this propaganda will be enforced even more efficiently within the People's Communes, and that the authorities, by means of the rigid discipline and complete surrender of privacy that characterize these collective institutions, will be able to achieve their aim more effectively than they could otherwise have hoped for.

AUSTRALIA AND THE RECOGNITION OF CHINA

B. D. BEDDIE*

In his article on 'The Chinese Governments' in the December issue of this journal, Professor Palmier advocated policies leading to the recognition of two Chinese governments, the Government of mainland China and the Government of Formosa. It is not my purpose to question the possibility or the wisdom of the 'two Chinas' solution provided (and this I believe is the tacit assumption in Professor Palmier's article) that the United States and certain of her allies should seek by concerted means to bring it about. The question that I wish to raise is whether a state like Australia, acting alone, could hope to promote a satisfactory 'two Chinas' solution by a qualified recognition of the Peking Government as the government of mainland China. It is worth considering the question in this form, first, because it is unlikely that the United States will in the near future adopt a 'two Chinas' policy, and secondly, because at the last Federal elections the Australian Labour Party stated that it would, if returned, recognize the Peking Government. While Dr Evatt did not specify the terms in which the recognition would be extended, he did speak of effective control as an important criterion of recognition.¹ Since Formosa is under the effective control of the Nationalist Government it seems probable that he had in mind some reservation about the position of that island.

So far as the formal act of recognition is concerned, there is certainly nothing to prevent the Australian Government from recognizing the Peking Government on such conditions as it wishes to lay down. Since, as Professor Palmier has pointed out, recognition is a unilateral act, no objections from Peking could affect it in any way. Objections from Peking could, however, affect the bilateral arrangements—the exchange of diplomatic missions, the promotion of trade and the cultivation of friendly relations—which, in this particular case at least, would be the prime objectives to be attained by recognition. And there is little doubt that if the Australian Government were to recognize the Chinese communist régime in terms designed to achieve a 'two Chinas' solution, Peking would raise difficulties.

The attitude of the Peking Government to qualified recognition

1. Policy Speech of October 15, 1958.

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was clearly stated in Article 56 of the Common Programme in September, 1949.

'The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China may negotiate and establish diplomatic relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty with foreign governments which sever relations with the Kuomintang reactionaries and adopt a friendly attitude towards the People's Republic of China.'

That the principle stated in Article 56 has in no way been modified was made very clear in Chou En-lai's speech to the National People's Congress on April 15, 1959:—

'China is willing to establish diplomatic relations on an equal footing with all countries. There are now no diplomatic relations between China and the United States and indeed their relations are very bad. . . . There is only one United States of America in the world. Likewise there is only one China in the world. Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu. All U.S. armed forces in the Taiwan area must be withdrawn. No plot to carve up Chinese Territory and create "two Chinas" can be tolerated by the Chinese people. In accordance with this principle any country that desires to establish diplomatic relations with our country must sever so-called diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and respect our country's legitimate rights in international affairs.'

The manner in which the Chinese Communist Government has applied its declared policy on recognition can be illustrated by referring to the experience of three other powers, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan.

(i) When the United Kingdom recognized Communist China in January, 1950, it made no attempt to define the geographical area covered by the name 'China', nor did it recognize Chiang Kai-shek's Government as the Government of Formosa. It did, however, make clear, both before and after the date on which it extended recognition, that it regarded the position of Formosa as indeterminate, as awaiting settlement under the Japanese Peace Treaty.² The United Kingdom Government continues to regard the position of Formosa as indeterminate on the ground that, although the Japanese Peace Treaty detached the island from Japan, it neither handed it over to another country nor granted it independence.³ The United Kingdom

2. See statements by Mayhew and Younger in the House of Commons on November 14, 1949 and July 26, 1950.

3. See statement by Nutting in the House of Commons November 26, 1951.

still has no diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek's Government, though it does maintain a consulate at Tamsui.

In short, while the United Kingdom does not positively recognize Communist China's claim to Formosa, its policy does not exclude that possibility at a future date. Inasmuch as it does not recognize Chiang Kai-shek and regards the position of Formosa as indeterminate, its policy is more acceptable to Peking than could be the policy of a government aiming at a 'two Chinas' solution. Nevertheless the United Kingdom has not succeeded in establishing even satisfactory diplomatic relations⁴ with Peking and, much less, generally cordial relations. In July, 1958, the Chinese Foreign Minister listed the factors that still prevented improved relations with the United Kingdom.⁵ They were (1) the British vote against the restoration of Communist China's seat in the U.N., (2) what he described as Britain's continued recognition of Chiang Kai-shek, (3) the continued existence, for allegedly business reasons, of a British consulate in Taiwan.

(ii) Of the countries that have not recognized Communist China, Canada has probably given the most serious consideration to the possibility of a 'two Chinas' solution. Canada's genuine interest in this problem has arisen from its concern to bring Canadian policies into close alignment with those of Britain wherever possible, to promote international trade and to curb the warlike propensities of the Chinese Nationalist Government. In his statement to the House of Commons on February 26, 1959, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr S. E. Smith) emphasized that his Government saw few if any legal difficulties in the way of recognizing the Peking Government. He was also, he said, impressed with certain advantages that would result from admitting China into the United Nations and into official international diplomacy. But, Mr Smith continued, these advantages could outweigh the disadvantages of recognition only if 'there is a desire on the part of the Chinese to settle outstanding problems'. The Canadian Government having 'continually and continuously' considered this problem 'for the last several years' was still not convinced that the Peking Government would not use recognition to aggravate rather than to improve relations with Canada. 'Should we,' he asked, 'recognize mainland China until we have reason to believe that our act will not result in deterioration of relations other than the opposite?'

4. The status of diplomatic missions is held at a level described by the Chinese as 'offices of chargé d'affaires'.

5. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 29, 1958.

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While Mr Smith was apparently reluctant to specify the detailed grounds on which his Government's decision was based, the main reasons for it seem to have been supplied in an interview in July, 1958, between Dalglish, a Canadian editor, and Chen Yi, Communist China's Foreign Minister.⁶ Asked by Dalglish about the possibilities of establishing normal relations, Chen Yi is reported to have replied: 'What are the possibilities for the Canadian Government to recognize China? What are the possibilities for the Canadian Government to vote in favour of restoring to China its legitimate position in the United Nations? What are the possibilities for the Canadian Government to sever diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek? In my view there are still difficulties.'

Chen Yi went on to stress that there cannot be two Chinas and that conditional recognition on Canada's part would be of little value.

(iii) For reasons of foreign trade and of internal political stability, the Japanese Government would derive great benefits from a 'two Chinas' solution. While it is true that the Japanese are under strong United States and Formosan pressure not to recognise mainland China, the Peking Government has also made perfectly clear that qualified recognition would be quite unacceptable to it. When Tadatakata Sata, a socialist leader who has long supported a rapprochement between Japan and China, interviewed Chen Yi in August, 1958, the latter told him that a prime condition for improved relations would be immediate suspension by Japan of conspiracies to create two Chinas. The intense resentment of the Chinese Communists against Japan's connections with the Nationalist Government were demonstrated in May, 1958, when the Peking Government, possibly at considerable economic loss to itself, suspended the agreement for large-scale trade which it had just negotiated with certain Japanese business associations. A study of this incident would reveal the intense pressure and the highly discriminatory means which Peking will apply in the attempt to enforce acceptance of its diplomatic demands.⁷

From the evidence outlined above, it seems that the minimum condition on which Communist China will respond to recognition is that the recognizing power should cease to recognize and to have diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government in Formosa. The establishment of satisfactory diplomatic and trade relations with

6. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 29, 1958.

7. For developments in Sino-Japanese relations in the middle of 1958 see *Far Eastern Survey*, June, 1958, and *Oriental Economist*, April, May and June, 1958.

Communist China would probably require two further conditions to be met:— (1) the explicit recognition that Formosa is part of mainland China; and (2) positive support for the seating of representatives of the Peking Government in the United Nations. In short, the policy of the Chinese Communist Government has been carefully worked out to frustrate plans for a 'two Chinas' solution. Given favourable conditions and concerted pressure, the West may eventually still hope to achieve this solution. In the meantime, piecemeal recognition by small powers like Australia is more likely to aggravate relations with both Chinas than to result in the settled recognition of either government.

Apart from the effect of recognition on relations between Australia and the two Chinas, there is also the problem of its significance for relations between Australia and other countries in the Pacific. It is frequently assumed that Australia's recognition of mainland China could be carried out as a relatively isolated act having little or no bearing on other aspects of our Asian policy. The United Kingdom, it is said, has succeeded in recognizing mainland China while maintaining solidarity with United States' and Australian policy in most other respects. This argument, however, neglects the element of time; the difference between recognizing mainland China in 1959 rather than in 1950. In these nine years, there have been important changes in the position of Formosa and Korea, and in the status of the Indo-Chinese countries and of Malaya. There has also developed a complex system of alliances between a number of Asian states and the United States. Rightly or wrongly, Australia, through ANZUS and SEATO, is involved in this system of alliances. More particularly it has developed very close ties, both formal and informal, with the United States. Australian recognition of Communist China at the present time would be widely interpreted as a distinct modification in Australia's relations with the United States. Peking would almost certainly represent it as an initial breach to be widened by the application of consistent pressure on the Australian Government and public. Moreover, most, if not all, of the other Pacific countries with which Australia's security is directly or indirectly bound up, would resent our recognition as politically embarrassing for internal reasons and as a retreat, on our part, from collective solidarity against consistent Sino-Soviet pressure.

Although the Australian Government has, from time to time, indicated that it is aware of the genuine difficulties attending an isolated recognition of Peking, it is unfortunate that the major emphasis in

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its official statements has been consistently placed on the argument that Communist China's aggressive foreign policy and repressive internal system render it unfit for recognition and for membership in the United Nations. This argument readily invites effective answers and serves only to shift attention from the complex difficulties inherent in the issue.

THEORETICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

GEORGE MODELSKI*

THE ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE of International Relations, young though it may be, has already passed through two distinct stages of theoretical development. In its formative stage, between the two world wars, the dominant approach to it (as expounded, e.g., by Sir Alfred Zimmern) was eclectic. International Relations was regarded not as a coherent subject in the ordinary sense of the word, but as a bundle of subjects (such as law, economics, history) viewed from a common international angle, each giving rise to a distinct (legal, economic, historical, etc.) 'aspect' of international reality. But with the publication of E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) the eclectic approach began to be superseded by the power approach. Carr, and later H. J. Morgenthau and others, gave International Relations some badly-needed intellectual coherence by organizing its analysis around the concept of power, but they also did it at the expense of committing students of the subject to semi-metaphysical propositions about the struggle for power among nations.

Since the end of World War II the theoretical growth of International Relations has been rapid, and more importantly still, it has occurred as part of the world-wide expansion of the social sciences. The view gained ground that following the example set by Economics, Sociology or Social Anthropology, the successful development of International Relations, too, must be founded in an elaboration of the theoretical structure of the subject.¹ Nevertheless this third analytical stage in the growth of International Relations has been slow in arriving, for the task of constructing sound theories of international relations is both challenging and treacherous. Many have shied away from it and not until recently has a systematic venture into this field been published: Morton A. Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics*.² As the first book-length

1. Richard Snyder (*Decision-making as an approach to the study of International Politics*, 1954) and Quincy Wright (*The study of International Relations*, 1955) are among the authors convincingly arguing the case for an analytical theory of International Relations. Since 1949 *World Politics* has served as a forum for articles advocating, expounding and evaluating theoretical advances in International Relations.

2. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1957.

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exposition of theoretical International Relations in the style of the social sciences his book deserves sympathetic, though careful, examination.

I

Morton Kaplan presents 'an initial or introductory theory of international politics' in a form intended primarily for professional students of the subject and not for laymen. A reader of this book will probably wish that the pages were more readable, that the terse sequences of argumentation were more often relieved by illustrations, that the selected illustrations were recounted in a richer prose and with a greater sense of humility for the variety of international experience, and correspondingly, for the limitations of a method that can, as yet, throw light only marginally on great, almost elemental processes. But after all this has been said, the book nevertheless represents an important addition to the professional equipment of scholars in International Relations, it marks an important stage in the 'professionalisation' of International Relations.

The world of learning today is a world of academic specialisms. Each academic specialism boasts of recognized authorities, distinctive methods, great books and its own terminology and, as a mark of success, it tends towards 'professionalisation': the building up of professional standards, the development of professional loyalties and the institution of distinctive training programmes. For reasons connected partly with its universal interest and appeal and partly with its recent origin, International Relations has so far made poor progress towards 'professionalisation'; its field suffers from vague demarcation, it has few authorities, little method and no vocabulary of its own. Professor Kaplan's book is important because it is likely to stimulate that progress in several ways: by defining analytically the subject matter of international relations, by advancing numerous systematic propositions about it, and by introducing a whole new technical vocabulary. For years to come his will be a book without a mention of which a professional discussion of International Relations will be incomplete.

A specialized vocabulary is one of the hall-marks of a profession. It stores new knowledge, facilitates precise expression; and it erects a sanctuary where strangers cannot enter without the preliminary labour of assimilating a new language and the thought processes implicit in it. About Kaplan's terminology one may have two opinions: his effort to create an entire vocabulary at one stroke seems over-ambitious, yet many of his labels are undoubtedly going to stick. At first one might have doubts about using terms like 'national actor' for the state or 'universal actor' for UNO, but then

one recognizes that for purposes of theory it is valuable to underscore the common properties of these two kinds of members of the international society. Yet some of his terms, especially those in the chapters on integrative and disintegrative processes seem less happy, and the abundance of new terms adds to the difficulty of following his argument.

Although the work may, with some justification, be called the first professional book on International Relations, it is also, unmistakably the product of a generation of writing on this subject and stands right in the middle of current work on it. But this characteristic of Kaplan's work is, unfortunately, not immediately apparent. His book has no bibliography and extremely few allusions to other writings;³ e.g., the only historical reference being to R. B. Mowat, a historian writing in the 1920's. Natural scientists have the commendable habit of prefacing their discussion by reference to work previously done on the subject, to indicate, as it were, the intellectual pedigree of certain propositions. The same habit could usefully be adopted in International Relations, for there, too, an extensive bibliography can already be compiled for every conceivable topic. The author discusses well-worn subjects such as balance of power or national interest, as if no one before him had ever succeeded in saying anything worthwhile about them. Or else he uses or criticises propositions without identifying their origin.⁴ If International Relations theory is ever to become cumulative, and not merely a pretext for a few brilliant one-shot affairs, writers will have to start prefacing their work by references to earlier theories.

Professor Kaplan appears not to think highly of previous writing in International Relations, yet his book is also obviously a product of earlier intellectual currents in this discipline. His work is in itself a good example of what was valuable in the eclectic approach to International Relations. Despite a weakness for game theory, he effectively synthesizes a number of approaches without falling into the common error of attributing undue explanatory power to insights imported from any one auxiliary discipline. Having sampled a variety of disciplines that have a bearing on world politics he em-

3. One reference in the chapter on systems theory, two in the chapter on regulatory processes and eight in the chapter on game theory.

4. In two passages (pp. 12ff. and 152ff.) his quarrel is with Hans J. Morgenthau although the name is never once mentioned in the whole book; the five 'patterns of choice' characteristic of national actors (pp. 56-9) bear close resemblance to Talcott Parsons' and Edwards Shils' five 'pattern variables' (cf. *Toward a General Theory of Action*, 1954) and an elucidation of similarities and differences between the two schemes would have added to the interest of the discussion.

plays analogies from psychology and concepts from recent sociological and some physiological writings, and shows mastery of the finer points of game theory and the mathematics relevant to it. His only obvious gap seems to be in economics. The power approach, too, has exerted evident influence upon the whole book. The author criticises some of the 'power' concepts, but uses certain well-known propositions in his own theoretical constructions, notably in the 'essential rules' he specifies for certain international systems.⁵

II

The theory of International Relations has three main sub-divisions. First, the theory of international systems, which seeks to devise typologies of systems, analyses forces that maintain and disrupt systems and traces processes whereby one system is transformed into another. Secondly the analysis of foreign policy, which inquires into the behaviour of states and other international actors. Thirdly, the theory of international relationships, which takes as its chief interest the characteristic modes of interdependence of actors in the international system, such as alliance, war, trade or regionalism. The sub-divisions are in effect different vantage points from which to analyse one and the same body of phenomena, international behaviour. Each one of these three vantage points, the system, its unit, the relationship, yields distinct, yet complementary, insights into world politics, distinct because the problems which loom important, for instance, in the study of systems (such as system stability) cannot be studied effectively from the two other points of view; complementary because only a collation of observations obtained from each one of the three vantage points produces a rounded picture of international relations.

Professor Kaplan explores all the three sub-divisions of International Relations theory. His most thorough and substantial contribution belongs, however, to the first of these, the theory of systems. Of systems he distinguishes six: the universal international system (roughly, world confederation based on UNO); the hierarchical international system (world empire); the loose bipolar system (the world of the 1950's); the tight bipolar system (two blocs only, no uncommitted states); the balance of power system (roughly, 18th and 19th century Europe); the unit veto system (in

5. 'Act to increase capabilities . . . oppose any coalition . . . which tends to assume a position of predominance . . .' (p. 23). Note that the emotionally neutral 'capability' is substituted for 'power', a change which robs the earlier phrase 'act to increase power' of much of its rich flavour.

effect, all units armed with H-bombs and long-range rockets).⁶

The basis of this classification is the number of great powers in an international system, and, secondarily, the degree of solidarity within it. Thus the distinction is drawn between international systems comprising several great powers (balance of power or unit veto systems), two or three great powers (the bi-polar systems) or one political unit only (the universal or hierarchical systems). The application of the solidarity criterion yields a similar progression from the least solidary (balance of power and unit-veto) to the most solidary (hierarchical and universal) systems.

This reviewer has never been much impressed by the importance of the so-called 'small number factor' for international systems. It is plain and for all to see that the number of international actors is small, but this is axiomatic. International systems would not be international systems if it were otherwise. True, the one-unit world empire or world federation have for long exercised fascination on the human mind and, if for that reason only, they must be included in analytical alternatives to multi-unit international systems. But the world state is not yet with us, and within the multi-unit system there is no essential difference between systems with two, three, five or seven great powers, for the following reasons. First, because the world as we know it is never neatly divided between two or seven great powers, but is always an untidy collection of great, medium, small and midget states, each with its recognized and essential place in the international hierarchy. An analytical system that ignores medium and small powers and their stabilizing influences misses the substance of international relations. Secondly, even within a world of seven great powers it will be found that the 'tone' is set by one or two powers currently at the top of the ladder (e.g., Austria and Britain in the first half of the 19th century, Germany and Britain in the second half), which yet cannot be said to 'dominate' the system. Even among the great powers there are gradations between those on the up-grade and others on the down-slope, content to follow the leadership of others, destined soon to relapse to the status of medium powers. Thirdly, conclusions drawn from the 'small number factor' mainly relate to the stability of systems (a two-unit system is said to be less stable than a five or seven-unit system). This type of generalization is quite misleading. Social systems are

6. The only system with an explicit mention of weapons of mass destruction. No reference is made to the effects of space exploration, a process which within a decade may radically affect the international system (e.g., by creating a new 'colonial frontier' and displacing conflicts to the periphery of the system, possibly exhausting the main space-contestants, altering the basis of international solidarity).

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not unstable because they are composed of only two units (thus in internal politics the two-party system is held to be more stable than the multi-party system) but because the system, being divided by deep hostility, fails to generate its own solidarity and is unable to satisfy the interests of its members. Periods of polarization of power are periods of disturbances, conflict and war; to say that a polarized system is unstable is either to be tautologous or to confuse cause and effect.

With reference to solidarity, worth questioning is the view that the historical balance of power system had a low degree of solidarity (as evidenced, *inter alia*, by the ease with which alliances were made and unmade). Instead, it might be argued that alliance freedom indicates a high degree of basic solidarity; it is the property of systems of jockeying for positions; free from permanent hostility and uncontrolled violence. Rigidity in alliance preference is the characteristic of systems of low solidarity, where rifts and divisions run so deep that even the smallest change in coalition arrangements leads to profound disturbance. Nor would it seem that the unit veto system (each unit armed with H-weapons) must necessarily be non-solidary and alliance-free; it might conceivably be so, but on the other hand, even a state armed with weapons of total annihilation might find it advantageous to co-ordinate its policies with those of other powers.

Still on the 'small number factor', it appears doubtful if Morton Kaplan makes a sufficiently strong case for drawing a theoretical distinction between the European system of the 18th and 19th centuries and the world of the 1950's. He argues, briefly, that the nature of the international system has altered from a balance of power condition to loose bipolarity because the number of 'essential actors' is now reduced to two bloc-leaders each of which controls a more or less monolithic bloc. Integrative functions previously performed by the 'balancer' (holder of the balance of power) are now in the hands of the universal actor (UNO) and of the non-committed states.

Not one of these differentiating factors appears convincing. To view the U.S.-led and the Communist blocs as monolithic or their membership as 'almost irreversible' is to take all interest out of international politics. The Sino-Soviet alliance, for one, should never be taken for granted, nor need Soviet troubles in Eastern Europe be minimized. In the West, too, inept statesmanship might lead even to a break in NATO (e.g., in favour of West European unity), and may easily take Latin America, Japan and more Asian and African powers into neutralism. Iraq has just shown how bloc membership

may be reversed. What Professor Kaplan depicts as monolithic blocs is really the familiar sight of two coalitions, each never sure of its own cohesion. Nor is it true to say that the two bloc leaders are the only states that really matter. Communist China is rapidly attaining world power status, India has an acknowledged place among leading states, and Britain, France, West Germany and Japan each are great powers in good standing. This brings the list of great states to eight, and as was earlier on pointed out, a situation in which for a time two states set the tone of world politics is not altogether unfamiliar. As to the integrating functions, the universal actor (UNO) is not a feature of the loose bi-polar system; it functioned in a multi-unit system between the two wars (League of Nations) and declined in value as a bi-polar pattern began to emerge in the mid-1930's. The uncommitted states are not peculiar to the bi-polar world either. At all times the international system has known powers that were not anxious to become involved in the prevailing quarrels. In the 19th century and later the U.S.A. frequently remained uncommitted and played the mediating role with great distinction. Finally, not only uncommitted states but members of coalitions, too, may undertake conciliatory, moderating and therefore integrative functions in the world system (witness allied and especially British influence on U.S. policy).

Thus on Professor Kaplan's own showing there seems no ground for differentiating between the international system of the 18th and 19th centuries and present-day world politics. If his assumptions were retained one might have to argue that the old balance of power has in its essentials persisted to the present day. And in one important sense this proposition is true. The system of independent states which arose in Europe at the close of the Middle Ages, is still with us (though on a world-wide scale) and shows little sign of passing away. The number and influence of states has fluctuated but never has the number of great powers fallen below three and of the others below at least two dozen. States still fundamentally rely upon their own power in fending for themselves and jealously guard their rights from foreign domination or interference.

But if the thesis of the basic continuity of the multi-state system over the past few centuries is soundly based, its unqualified acceptance would seem to do violence to that intuitive feeling that before our very eyes momentous changes are under way in the international system. What is the nature of these changes?

The most striking change in the contemporary world has been the radical transformation in the character of states. If we compare a typical 16th or 17th century monarchy, such as France,

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Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire or China, with a modern 20th century state such as the U.S.A., Britain, France or the U.S.S.R., we would say that the change was one of transition from a traditional 'Agrarian' to a modern 'Industrial' state,⁷ agrarian and industrial referring respectively not merely to differences in the prevailing mode of economic organization, but even more importantly to contrasts in social and cultural structures. For international affairs purposes the differences between agrarian and industrial states seem to be two: (1) in the industrial state, characteristically a national state, the community whose interests policy-makers implement embraces nearly the entire citizen population; in the agrarian state the goals of foreign policy are set by the interests and ambitions of the ruler without reference to the preoccupations of his subjects (hence territorial possessions can be moved as chips in a game without disturbing the populations affected by them; in the industrial system a territorial change involves vast population movements and is impracticable as a common method of territorial adjustment); (2) the power available to and utilized by policy-makers has risen spectacularly; in the industrial system the entire population participates in implementing foreign policy and produces instruments of immense power; in the agrarian society the resources of policy-makers are strictly limited and foreign policy operations sporadic and limited in duration.

If it is possible to differentiate between agrarian and industrial states in respect of foreign affairs then one can justifiably surmise that international systems composed predominantly of agrarian states exhibit different characteristics from systems comprising primarily industrial states. The following hypothesis may be put forward: that the rise of the first industrial state (Britain in the 19th century) initiated a process which altered the foundation of international society, that the First World War marked the birth of the industrial international system and that the growth of that system will not be complete as long as numerous states remain 'under-developed'.

The model of an agrarian international system would show the following characteristics:

1. small scale, low intensity international contacts;
2. weapon technology of limited destructiveness;
3. status and function determined by tradition, as amended by war;

7. I use 'agrarian' and 'industrial' in the technical sense developed by Fred W. Riggs in 'Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration' (W. J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, University of Indiana, 1957, pp. 23-116 *passim*).

4. system cohesion based on cultural homogeneity and solidarity of the rulers.

The more complex industrial international system has, by contrast, the following properties:

1. large scale, high intensity international contacts, hence need for international organization;
2. weapon technology of high destructiveness and a stimulus for continuous industrial and technological growth;
3. status and function determined by industrial and technological achievement (as indirect evidence of capacity to wage war) and by functional contribution to the working of the system;
4. need for system cohesion high but its basis as yet uncertain.

This is not the place to elaborate upon a hypothesis of this complexity. Suffice it to say that certain features of Professor Kaplan's loose bipolar system (such as the importance of UNO, the intensity of co-operation between allies and the growth of new rule functions) fit more easily into the developing industrial international system than into bipolarity, and that the threat of thermonuclear war might be contained more easily within a framework whose value system is based not on success in war but on industrial and technological achievement (cf. the prestige and influence accruing to the U.S.S.R. from launching the first earth satellite), even if that achievement is an indirect indication not only of capacity to produce goods but also of ability to wage war. The industrial international system in which foreign policy goals are sought by independent powers less by reliance on force and, even more than in the past, by skill in manoeuvring (lifemanship?), appears more likely to persist than some of its logical alternatives such as the non-solidary unit veto system, the world empire or the world federation.

III

That states and other international actors play an important and distinctive role in theoretical International Relations need hardly be reiterated. Less widely understood may be the requirement that such a theory must bring to life an ever-present duality in those international personalities: the contrast between their monolithic performance on the world stage and the confusing tangle of the internal processes, power structures and political formations which goes to make up that performance.

Professor Kaplan accounts well for the international personality of states. He succeeds in bringing out with unusual clarity the all-pervasive influence which different kinds of international *milieu* have upon the behaviour of the states. He has pages of illuminating

discussion on the functional and dysfunctional effects which national policy may exert upon the international system. He introduces a suggestive classification of the behaviour of states *qua* actors on the international scene, pointing, *inter alia*, to the distinctions between national, bloc and supranational actors (about the behavioural characteristics of the two latter ones he could be clearer), and between directive and non-directive actors. (The terms of agrarian and industrial state, too, could be added to this classification; they are useful, e.g., in current discussions of policies of 'underdeveloped' countries). And finally he indicates roles which states might be called upon to play in different kinds of international system.

Less adequately treated is the internal make-up of international actors.⁸ Morton Kaplan pleads that 'any attempt to describe the actual actor system would founder under the weight of the parameters which individualise these systems' (p. 54), and thus although he is aware of the multifarious influences bearing upon state behaviour he virtually abandons any attempt to systematize them and to come to the aid of those students of international politics whose legitimate centre of interest is the foreign policy of a single state studied for its own sake, and not only in relation to the stability of the international system.

In Chapter One the author shows his awareness that the political systems he is discussing can be conceived of as input-output systems.⁹ He introduces the notion of the 'step-level function' (an input which alters the characteristic behaviour of the system) and talks of 'coupled systems' (in which the output of one unit, e.g., U.S. foreign policy, serves as the input of another unit, say the United Kingdom) but he does not attempt systematically to analyse foreign policy in terms of input-output concepts. Yet input-output analysis has several uses in the study of foreign policy.

At the descriptive level it is a device for the orderly presentation of the variety of factors which influence the formation and execution of a foreign policy. The two principal foreign policy inputs are power-inputs (or capability-inputs, e.g., the services of the armed forces) and demand-inputs (or interests: national, sectional or ex-

8. One detects a note of impatience for the 'complications' which internal issues introduce in the 'rational' execution of foreign policy strategies.

9. For the use of input-output concepts in political science see David Easton, 'An approach to the analysis of political systems', *World Politics*, April, 1957; in public administration see Fred W. Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-6; in the description of an international organization see J. A. Modelski, 'The South-East Asia Treaty Organization', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, May, 1959.

ternal claims and expectations implemented by policy-makers).¹⁰ The output of an international actor consists of foreign policy operations (e.g., dispatch of a mission, movement of troops, foreign aid). This way of describing foreign policy suggests that the function of policy-makers is to 'convert' inputs into outputs, a function whose creative aspects seem to be absent from discussions of mere 'decision-making'.

At the analytical level the input-output model yields certain useful generalisations. Thus if a balance is postulated between inputs and outputs, causal connections can be traced, e.g., between changes in power-inputs and alterations in foreign policy operations. The model (which assumes perfect flexibility and complete information) also provides clues to the 'ideal' working of a foreign policy, for divergences between actual and expected performance (e.g., when output fails to adjust to input variations) can be attributed to rigidities in the foreign policy process and to lack of information in policy-making. Morton Kaplan throws light both upon flexibility and rigidity and upon factors affecting the use of information by decision-makers.

The power structure of a state (its territory, population, industrial and scientific potential) is not discussed at all (is it contempt for the power approach?). The structure of the political community and problems of building and maintaining new political systems are touched upon in greater length. The passages dealing with the formation of blocs and supranational actors (instances of new systems) are interesting but when the discussion proceeds in terms of 'multiple role-functions' and 'the emergence of new decision-making units' it seems too narrow in scope. One feels that the creation of a new polity, a near-miraculous act of statesmanship, demands more inspired treatment.

IV

The third sub-division of theoretical International Relations concerns international relationships—a vast, amorphous subject lacking the conceptual clarity of system or foreign policy analysis but full of such practically important problems as coalitions, aid giving and receiving, or war. Each one of these problems may be considered in its impact upon either the system or its individual units, but since each one of these problems is also important in its own right, and has properties discernible neither at the level of the system nor at the level of foreign policy analysis, international relationships demand separate theoretical attention.

10. Professor Kaplan's discussion of interests as system needs might be supplemented by the study of the demands actually made of policy-makers.

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The theory of games is one such approach to the study of relationships; Morton Kaplan devotes one quarter of his book to game theoretical analysis, yet, on his own presentation, the analysis has little to contribute towards a theory of international relations. Its theoretically solved part concerns zero-sum games (one player's losses equal his opponent's gains) which by common consent throw virtually no light on policy decisions. Non-zero sum games might give more insight, but their formalised treatment is less advanced and so far seems to have moved but little beyond the obvious. The theory has nothing to offer on coalitions. On risk and uncertainty the discussion is interesting but inconclusive. On deceit, the considered opinion that a little bluff is a good strategy, that bluff generally is not a good weapon in international politics (p. 237), is reassuring but not unexpected. The 'Prisoners' Dilemma' is real enough and a neat model of the nuclear stalemate and the temptations of a surprise attack, but game theory offers no solution to it.

A feature of game matrices is the graphic illustration they give of the interdependence of human actions, of how A's action depends upon the kind of choice that might be expected from B. At this point game theory attacks a problem that from another direction has been approached by sociology, especially in its study of roles and expectations and the compelling and stabilizing force they exercise upon social relationships.

The concept of role is familiar to Professor Kaplan; he applies it freely, with reference both to the behaviour of individuals (e.g., when he discusses multiple role-functions of decision-makers) and to the policies of states and international organizations (e.g., when he talks of the role of balancer or of the mediatory role of UNO). Yet he seems to appreciate neither the difficulties encountered in the transition from individual to collective roles nor the implications of using the role concept with reference to foreign policies and in an international context. Roles presuppose a social system and political roles a political system, and yet Morton Kaplan uses the integrative role of balancer while claiming that the balance of power system lacks a political system (p. 23). Roles, too, presuppose a value system which legitimizes them and in terms of which role rights and duties are defined and sanctions for non-compliance with them are understood. None of these conditions is to be taken for granted in international relations.

The role concept is helpful in a number of problems other than those raised by Professor Kaplan. For instance, 'stratification roles' (i.e., the roles of great and small powers) may perform greater integrative functions in the international system than the roles of

balancer, of the uncommitted states. Role analysis is also useful in the description of stable relationships such as alliances, coalitions and international organizations (each of which also develops a degree of internal role differentiation), neutrality, mediation and war, and of relationships based on 'ascriptive' qualities, such as those with an Arab state or with a former colony. Each role can be described in terms of its origin (how the actor is 'recruited' or 'accommodates himself' to the role), the rights and duties engendered by it and the motivational forces maintaining or weakening it. The analysis of roles conduces to accuracy in the description of recurrent relationships and may also offer suggestions as to their stability.

A discussion of sociological role analysis and of game theory sheds light on the question whether concepts derived from sociology, anthropology or politics can contribute more to theoretical International Relations than propositions borrowed from game theory, economics and military science. So far, the disciplines dealing with specific relationships, fields of knowledge embracing specialized and semi-technological problems of achieving well-defined, concrete goals have made quicker and surer theoretical progress. Hence the temptation has been great to extrapolate to international relations theoretical tools devised for the study of specific relationships, such as those found in economics, game theory and military science. Although it is true that each of these may contribute something to the subject because parts of it (e.g., the analysis of state power, the allocation of resources, bargaining) raise technological, logistic or social engineering problems, the uncritical transfer of such theories to international relations is fraught with great risks. Morton Kaplan recognises that game theory must be put into a wider political and social setting (pp. 247-8), yet his international systems are bounded by 'rules' as if they were huge games.

The difficulty about International Relations is this: like life itself, it is diffuse, impossible to define clearly or concretely, yet all-pervasive and all-important. Conceptual frameworks purporting to impose upon it order and coherence, to explain it in terms of the observance of specific rules or the pursuit of specific objects such as power, bases, profits, or colonies, are not altogether wrong, but ignore this essential point. International Relations raises problems of the same order as those involved in understanding society, family life or politics. This is not to argue that problems of this latter kind are beyond our understanding, but merely that disciplines attuned to these diffuse yet key problem areas, such as sociology, anthropology or politics, promise more enlightening although perhaps less

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precise theoretical analogies than ideas derived from economics, games or military science.

V

Appraising Morton Kaplan's theoretical system as a whole one is tempted to describe it, using the author's own terminology, as decidedly sub-system dominant. Within the theoretical system composed of three sub-systems (system theory, foreign policy analysis, relationship theory) one such sub-system, the theory of international systems, dominates the rest. International actors and their foreign policies, and international relationships (with the partial exception of game theory) he treats as incidental to international systems and propositions relating to them as applications of 'systemic' theorems, restatements of system theory from the point of view of actors or relationships, but not autonomous theoretical constructions recognizing actors and relationships as independently worthwhile fields of inquiry in International Relations. The unity of his framework is an imposed unity which is the result of the extension of system-theoretic propositions to actor and relationship fields and not a harmonious union of its three essential components, a union enriching and lending additional power to each of its three parts.

But if this may be said in criticism of his system, it still remains to acknowledge Professor Kaplan's contribution to International Relations theory. His book is a mine of new concepts and intriguing generalizations which one could continue discussing for many more pages. It would be ungrateful to conclude an extended review of his work in any other way than by indicating respect for this thought-provoking study.

THE NEW COMMONWEALTH

COLIN A. HUGHES*

THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE WORLD. *J. D. B. Miller*. Duckworth, 1958, 25/- stg.

THE CABINET IN THE COMMONWEALTH: POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA, THE WEST INDIES AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. *H. V. Wiseman*. Stevens, 1958, 50/- stg.

In the growing literature on the Commonwealth of Nations each of these books performs a useful function without being entitled to a place in the first class of major works. Professor Miller has provided an admirable introduction to the Commonwealth, its structure and its members, which is exactly the thing to provide undergraduates or the general reader with a brief conspectus of the development of the Commonwealth to the middle of 1958. Dr Wiseman breaks newer ground in his survey of the development of semi-responsible and responsible government in those British colonies which have undergone substantial constitutional advance since the Second World War. Whilst probably it is not suitable for a students' textbook, and would be very heavy going for those uninformed on parliamentary and colonial government, it is a very useful work of reference, and much of the analysis is stimulating and will undoubtedly influence future discussion on this subject.

Two of the major developments in the Commonwealth in the post-war period have been the admission of five new full members and the advance of a far larger number towards internal self-government which is the penultimate stage to full membership, and used to be described as responsible government—a term now falling into disuse. As each of the books deals with only one of the developments, a casual reader might not see the close inter-relationship of the two, and the problems of the border area between them. The problems would include the extent to which H.M. Government in the United Kingdom should try to produce a constitution for the ultimate stage which will protect racial, religious, linguistic or tribal minorities within the new state, the role to be played by expatriate civil servants and the extent to which civil service neutrality should be fortified by a civil service commission protected in its turn by provisions of a rigid constitution, and so on. Dr Wiseman shows how these tasks have been made more difficult by earlier reliance on the British model and practice. When experience and instruction have pointed to the supremacy of cabinet, the subordination of civil servants to popularly-elected ministers, the superiority of legislature over judiciary, the discreet dragooning of minorities into the largest possible territorial unit for easy administration, it is difficult to reverse the process or to explain qualifications when independence is imminent. The biologists have it that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, and it has frequently been observed that the constitutional development of each British colony recapitulates in rough outline British constitutional history since 1066. The one or two decades given to the advance from pure representative government to fully responsible government must reproduce the evolution of British central government from Anne to Victoria, and such a period gives little opportunity for the development of what must be a new style of govern-

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ment, differing both from the indigenous political practices of a generation or two earlier (for only in the West Indies is there no possibility of such a revival) and from the factious opposition and quasi-revolutionary activity of the colonial period.

There is a second gap between the two books. I do not wish to be so unfair to either scholar whose work is reviewed here as to say that their modest intentions have suffered therefrom, only to point to a weakness which I believe exists in all Commonwealth studies. Professor Miller's hand, which has sketched in the character and the problems of the old dominions so skilfully, falters when he comes to the newest members and those on the brink of membership. Dr Wiseman examines the constitutional development of the emergent states with reference only to the practices of parliamentary government in the United Kingdom, when often illuminating comparisons could be drawn with the old dominions and India. What is really needed is the great synthesis in which the politics of old and new Commonwealth are combined in equal detail and depth, whether it be prepared with the incisiveness of Brady's *Democracy in the Dominions* or the monumental scholarship of Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*. Of course the monographs and articles on which such a structure could be erected are still scanty, and the canvas is probably too large for any one man to attempt if he must first examine primary sources. A promising start was made with the series of studies of colonial legislatures edited by Miss Margery Perham, and Dr Wiseman expresses the hope that his work may launch a comparable series of studies of cabinet government in the new Commonwealth much as Mr Martin Wight's *The Development of the Legislative Council, 1660-1945*, set the tone for the Perham series. I think, with respect, that his proposal is misconceived. Very little can be known about the workings of cabinet or Executive Council in any one territory; a century of responsible government in Australia still leaves those who would write about cabinet here with little to do but paraphrase Jennings with the few pinches of anecdotes which can be gleaned from the press and Hansard, and these mainly concern malfunctioning rather than normal operation, or to attempt to characterize the Australian 'style' of cabinet government which means talking about the entire political system. To describe all the machinery of government appears to be beyond what Dr Wiseman envisages, although I suspect that it would be necessary, and the broad scope of the Perham studies tends to confirm this view.

Professor Miller rightly observes that the development of the Commonwealth has been based on the growth of colonial nationalism and British constitutional concessions, stimulus and response. In the narrower field of executive-legislative relations, it might be said that the process has been the stimulus of the appearance of a nationalist movement-cum-party willing and possibly able to take responsibility, and the response the transfer of legislative power to an elected majority in the Legislative Council and of executive power to elected ministers in the Executive Council. The energy of the stimulus comes in unequal parts, the greater from nationalist sentiment in the territory concerned, a smaller but sometimes significant part from a complex of interests including the opposition party at Westminster, specialist colonial study groups and broad external factors such as 'Asian' or 'African' or even 'American' or 'international' opinion. There will also be forces of inertia internal and external to the sub-system. Thus the response will probably represent a compromise determined by some sort of vector analysis of these forces, rather than by a

rational determination of the best or most effective constitutional form for the situation. The Burkean would argue that the two are the same, but in the rapidly changing politics of emergent states the constitutional aspirations of political leaders are often dangerous and unsuited to achieve the broader goals which they seek. Compromise may have been produced only for the sake of apparent impartiality, and the variations in constitutional machinery which Dr Wiseman describes sometimes may have been unnecessary. Unfortunately Dr Wiseman has failed to provide very much information on the negotiations leading up to the constitutional advances which he records. To attribute the introduction of the Bushe Experiment in Barbados solely to those general defects of the Old Representative System listed in the Governor's speech overlooks the anomalous role of the Attorney General, who, although an official, had to contest a seat in the House of Assembly to act as Government spokesman there, and the appearance of party blocs in the House. On a number of occasions the need for brevity and reliance on secondary sources causes a slight error of emphasis in detail in Wiseman's account, even though its main outlines are sound.

Many of the old bonds of Commonwealth have been broken. No longer is there the possibility of a common defence and foreign policy, a common sovereign, or common legal institutions. The economic tie with its multiple strands of imperial preference, British capital exports and sterling has substantially altered, and is likely to alter still more over the next decade. Steadily growing in importance through the elimination of alternative links has been the maintenance by all of a parliamentary form of government. Miller points to the dangers of making too much of this: many countries outside the Commonwealth have used parliaments as fig-leaves for absolutism, and there is far more to the maintenance of freedom in Britain itself than the mere existence of Parliament—the right of opposition, freedom of the press, a neutral civil service and the rule of law. Most important for our purposes here, he observes that some features of parliamentary life at Whitehall have failed to transplant to the old dominions with a British stock. This is an acute observation which is usually absent from studies of colonial government produced in the United Kingdom. Many of the outward trappings of parliament are taken for essentials, and very often those who are attempting to pursue the essence of parliamentary government in an emergent state are bemused by too heavy reliance on Westminster. The reviewer recalls one 'morning after' in the Jamaican House of Representatives when the Speaker and members joined in an orgy of self-condemnation for a display of parliamentary bad manners which in an Australian state legislature would have been regarded as nothing more than a good slanging-match. It may be that those who can claim parliament by a right of blood inheritance can afford to be freer with it, perhaps because other institutions and the whole structure of society help to support it. But it also is a disservice to those who are genuinely seeking effective and democratic government for their new states to set standards unduly high, so high that some old members of the club might well have their credentials questioned, and one whose name need hardly be mentioned would most certainly be rejected. Dr Wiseman in his introduction refers to the suggestion of the Lahore Conference of 1954 that 'a firmly established Parliamentary system of government' should be one of the five requirements of Commonwealth membership, and quotes Professor Mansergh's subsequent letter to *The Times* which argued that 'in the circumstances of contemporary Asia there is little to be

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gained, and much might be lost, by seeking to impose an exacting standard in respect of government'. Wiseman would extend the demurrer to Africa and the West Indies. Professor Miller concludes that parliamentary government alone is not enough to explain the continuation of the Commonwealth, nor can it be counted on to be an effective tie for the future when the élites which have had direct experience of British parliamentarianism have died out or been replaced by groups more oriented to traditional values of the society in question.

Professor Miller seems disposed to having a single *deus ex machina* in each of his books, and the part played by syndicates in his *Australian Government and Politics* is here played by the concept of national interest. For the older dominions the myth of each national interest is compactly characterized. For the newer he points to the existence of 'latent national interest' which must crystallize when independence has been won and the facts of geographic and economic life must be faced. Then the new state discovers neighbours it hardly knew in the stifling domesticity of colonial status and savours the heady air of a free vote in the United Nations. 'A seer might have discerned them in advance; what he could not have discerned would be the emphasis to be given them, the precedence amongst them, the practical possibilities of achieving them.' For this reason the very general predictions which Professor Miller hazards for Ghana and Nigeria, and for the West Indies, are most likely to become dated. The pace of Africanism is certain to be faster than Miller, or any other non-African would have supposed a year ago. Similarly if the West Indies can survive its present teething pains, quite possibly it will attempt a more dynamic policy than he suspects. The future development of the smaller colonies must also be more of a challenge than he suggests, if only because, as *The Economist* mischievously suggested recently, Britain could grant all full independence and send them to vote the General Assembly into permanent recess as the *reductio ad absurdum* of national sovereignty.

A few minor points in conclusion. Professor Miller is to be commended for including four Low cartoons; it is a pity that there were no more. However, a bibliography would have been of assistance to the reader who makes his first acquaintance with the complexities of the Commonwealth through this book, for it is good enough to make him want to read more. Dr. Wiseman's volume contains a number of names misspelled and journals inaccurately cited, and there are one or two surprising omissions from an otherwise useful bibliography. Both books hold promise that their authors will return frequently to the complexities of the Commonwealth and thereby increase our debt to them.

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THE AUSTRALIANS IN GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1914-1921.

C. D. Rowley. Melbourne University Press, 1958, pp. xii + 371.

Australian price 52/6.

Since the second world war, and partly as a result of it, New Guinea studies have received considerable impetus. The establishment of a School of Pacific Studies in the Australian National University and, for more utilitarian purposes, of a School of Pacific Administration in Sydney, have enabled the mobilization of research resources which were lacking in the past. In the field of history, however, the results of this more serious attention have so far been rather meagre. *The Australians in German New Guinea, 1914-1921*, by the Principal of the School of Pacific Administration, is therefore welcome as the first substantial treatment of a comparatively short period in New Guinea history. As such it is a pioneer work and a successful one.

The book undertakes a rigorous examination of the period of military administration in the former German territory. This period has already received some treatment in that it was the subject of Volume X in the *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18—The Australians at Rabaul*, by Seaforth Mackenzie (Sydney, 1927); but Mackenzie's account was that of a participant, and unfortunately it looked at the scene from an official point of view. The inadequacy of its approach is suggested by the fact that a mere sixteen of its 412 pages were devoted specifically to 'The Administration of Native Affairs'. The emphasis of Mr Rowley's work by contrast is laid on native administration, and his approach is critical. After a section dealing with the Occupation and its administrative organization, and another devoted to the European economy in the Territory, he proceeds in his next thirteen chapters to the main concern of his work. Part III (Chapters 7-10) deals with native labour in private employ, Part IV (Chapters 11-13) with the contribution of the village to economic development, Part V (Chapters 14-17) with law and order, and Part VI (Chapters 18-19) with native agricultural and educational policies. A concluding section is devoted to the broader problems surrounding the transfer of the territory under mandate to Australia.

Broadly the story is one of a caretaker administration which, for a variety of reasons, acquiesced in an existing situation and, in consequence, never developed the outlines of a consistent and considered native policy. The main aim of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force was to preserve a functioning economy which was envisaged as a future Australian asset. Native policy, insofar as there was one, was determined by the requirements of this principal goal. The basis of economic policy was laid down in the Terms of Capitulation at the very beginning of the Occupation, by which German businessmen and planters, on taking an oath of neutrality, were permitted to return to their work. During the period of the Occupation, war-time copra prices and the virtual subsidy of the defence budget disguised the fact that New Guinea was not really a rich country. In the meantime the interim character of the military administration, its shortage of staff and its lack of experience, combined with the economic aims by which it was inspired, had serious implications for the future. During these years a pattern was set whose essential features were to carry over into the administration of the country under mandate. It is the author's view, which he supports in detail, that the record at all stages compared unfavourably with that already estab-

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lished in Papua, and that, in fact, the civil administration of the Mandated Territory commenced operation in 1921 'without a native policy'.

One might, perhaps, question Mr Rowley's implication that the explanation of later attitudes may be found in their origins in this period. There were, no doubt, many factors which moulded the formation, in the Territory of New Guinea, of an administrative tradition different from that established across the border in Papua. If Papua is to be taken as a standard against which the military administration is to be measured, it would be fair to note, for example, that economic pressures were slight in that Territory. From that point of view Murray had a favourable environment in which to develop his ideas of native government. Nevertheless Mr Rowley does make his point that the period he has selected for study was a crucial one in the setting of standards and the determining of habits.

While Papuan tradition provides a handy criterion of judgment, the main comparison must necessarily be with the practices of the German administration. Though it takes him outside his chosen period, Mr Rowley does tackle this aspect. The result is, naturally, a little tantalizing. Detailed comparisons are offered for particular aspects of native policy, but a more general analysis of German policy, described as 'a positive policy' (p. 192) possessing 'a coherence of its own' (p. 100) and with a 'vision of the native as the potential citizen of a community to be built by co-operation between him and the government' (p. 116), is lacking. It is stated that 'the best of the German tradition had been in conflict with the demands for immediate economic returns', but it is not clear, for example, in what way exactly the 'paternal theory' of the government differed from 'the theories of strict paternal discipline' of the planter (pp. 101, 106). But it is not fair to expect this fuller analysis to be undertaken here, and it is a virtue of the work that it does draw attention to the need for further studies of the same type.

Mr Rowley's book will be of most interest to the specialist. His crisp and compact style enables him to fit the maximum of information into the space available, and to do it with clarity, but it does not make for lively reading. And the work is a long one. For the reader with a close interest either in New Guinea or in more general principles of comparative colonial administration, however, he has produced an invaluable study.

J. D. Legge

CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALY, 1947-1957. Leicester C. Webb.
Melbourne University Press, 1958. Australian National University,
Social Science Monograph, No. 13.

'This essay', Professor Webb begins by saying, 'might be regarded as a post-script to D. A. Binchy's *Church and State in Fascist Italy*.' Quite so. The author lacks Binchy's charm, of course, and his humour; arguing that 'all religious creeds have not been "equally free before the law";' he adduces evidence that the local authorities have been known to cut off some Protestant pastors' water supply. But he has a virtue that Binchy's scholarship lacked: concision—sixty pages to read, against Binchy's near eight hundred. It is difficult to say how well he knows the current state of opinion in Italy, or how well he has covered the public press (a very different thing, in Italy as much as in Australia, from public opinion!); but he has certainly dug up

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material enough for an antecedently probable picture, or rather general outline.

His point of departure is the question why the perceptive Binchy should have been so sensationally wrong in his prophecy that the position of the Catholic Church in Italy must be damaged in the fall of the Fascist regime; whereas in fact the Republic re-affirmed Mussolini's Lateran Pact and Concordat. And he seeks the answer, first, in the dark age of the Italian Civil War (as it virtually was) 1941-5, and the 'afterglow of a movement that had united Italy' right and left; second, with far more detail and document, in the Constituent Assembly's debates (1946-8) on the Church's status. The Christian Democrats came into the Assembly in strength, as the only feasible alternative to the extreme left; Cavour liberalism, 'a free church in a free state', which prevailed in the other war-countries of the West, was identified in Italy with the parliamentary order whose failures in social policy paved the way for Mussolini. But at once conflict arose between the Peace Treaty's provisions for 'liberty of religion, liberty of opinion, and liberty of association', and the Constitution's recognition of the Vatican's *sovereignty* and (by implication) special status; also between a liberal constitution and a legal apparatus inherited from Mussolini's rule. And this conflict is the present situation. Professor Webb states, rather than criticises, the main positions: the 'liberal' fear that 'the object of the Church in Italy is to merge the citizen in the professing Catholic'; the Catholic 'integralists' who seem to intend just that, and to see the Civic Committees, and even Catholic Action (which two they tend to confuse), as means to this end; the 'Maritain' influence, Gasperi its political equivalent, which sees a clear disjunction of the spheres of activity of church and state, a line drawn between politics and morals which only an unjustly aggressive politician or an unjustly aggressive prelate would cross. Both communism and nationalism were prepared to accept the Church, simply as an irreducible fact in Italian life, or even as a noble ornament of it; thus he explains how Binchy's prediction was falsified by the event.

If there is any inadequacy in this study at its chosen level of very general analysis—and there is inadequacy, where the author shrugs his shoulders speaking of 'Church, Catholic Action, Christian Democracy' as a relationship 'too subtle and too flexible to be grasped in its working reality except by those who are involved in it directly and at a high level'—the inadequacy belongs perhaps to political science itself: when is it history, and when is it philosophy? Can it do its job unless it is both of these at once? Webb's work, of course, has historical perspective insofar as it presupposes Binchy's; but it is not quite good enough, surely, to hint no history to Christian democracy back beyond 1920 when Leo XIII's encyclicals on the subject used the very words of Renaissance theologians (it was, after all, the Spanish jurist Suarez, who defended popular sovereignty and religious toleration, not his Protestant antagonist, James I). And if here we have the true principles of a solution of church-state problems (which I must respectfully decline to call the 'Maritain influence') then the question is how to account for the strength of 'integralism' among the Italian Catholics. It is not a mere guelf inability to make distinctions (I am afraid that the terms 'guelf' and 'thomist' make only the most perfunctory appearance in this essay, the latter in the mouth of a Communist leader); it is the profoundly unsatisfactory nature of the Lateran Pact from the Church's point of view, that goes to account for this. The sovereign status of the Vatican City is uniquely dependent on the good will of one state: Italy. Therefore, and only therefore, that shrewd haggler, Pius XI, refused to

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treat as separate issues the Pope's primacy of Italy and his universal jurisdiction; he deliberately confounded them to strengthen his position; and in doing so he was able to draw on the support of purely national sentiment among the Italians. A dangerous ally, though better than trusting Il Duce; but now that Il Duce has gone, the danger is greater. But what alternative is there, as long as the Pope's claim to sovereignty, while recognised by many nations, so depends on one? There is an alternative, and a very important one in the eyes of the departed Gasperi: the force of opinion, particularly Christian democratic opinion, in the rest of Western Europe. Gasperi had a wider vision than the integralist Salazar and Franco. Professor Webb mentions this aspect without precisely locating its place in the argument. That the Christian Democratic parties have had a union of Western Europe quite explicitly in their sights, is a fact well known.

With this in mind, this kind of analysis of what is going on in Italy assumes a much larger importance: Italy is an essay in relations between sovereign state and sovereign church, which the whole of Western Europe may have to conduct sooner or later, though British Protestant opinion will undoubtedly seek to prevent this extension. I cannot help thinking that Professor Webb shares in some small degree this last viewpoint: suspicion that the Church's claim to *sovereign* jurisdiction over the faithful is unreasonable, and potentially incompatible with the perfectly reasonable claims of the state; a vague fear that behind 'integralism' lies the Inquisition. Perhaps if, for want of non-Catholic allies, the 'Maritain' *politique* fails to prevail over integralism among the Catholics, we shall know whom to thank! The issue has importance even in this country. But, to return to the book under review, it is perhaps unfair to expect so rounded a treatment of an introductory survey; provided these deeper and wider perspectives are not forgotten, we have, meanwhile, more light than we had on a dark patch in the foreground of the picture. Like all studies in politics, it suffers somewhat from the speed of events; already the Curia has added a chapter, a rather anti-integralist chapter, by its directives, which had some impact in Australia, distinguishing more sharply between Catholic Action as such and Catholic Social Action. But this does not end the politics. Much, as he rightly insists, depends not on Catholic doctrine, but on party groupings; this essay is designed to illuminate the latter rather than the former.

T. L. L. Suttor

FREE ELECTIONS. W. J. M. Mackenzie. George Allen and Unwin, 1958. pp. 184.

This little book originated in two series of lectures given by Professor Mackenzie when he visited East and Central Africa in 1952 and 1956. It is divided into four parts—voters and candidates, methods of voting, administration and adjudication, electoral morality and its enforcement. The author believes that there is some value in providing simple and objective descriptions of elections as one of the techniques of self-government, especially for countries which are on the verge of attaining independence and have no tradition of elected government to draw upon. For somewhat similar reasons, the volume will also be useful as an elementary text for students, who are regularly puzzled by the problems of quotas, preferences, cube laws and so on.

The book is the latest in a series of works which have appeared in recent

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years, whose authors have attempted to make 'horizontal' comparisons of political institutions. K. C. Wheare and Maurice Duverger are the two most notable practitioners in this field. The enormously rapid growth in the number of independent states in the last twelve years has contributed to this emphasis on political general knowledge. There is, however, always the danger that the sort of information contained in such books, attempting as they do to cover an enormous area very rapidly, may not rise very far above the level of the general knowledge quiz. Electoral methods, like other pieces of political machinery, become meaningful only in the context of a political system. The anthropologists long ago reacted against the horizontal approach to their subject, and the objections which are valid in the case of anthropology are at least as valid in the study of politics. There is always the danger that the amount of factual information will be too thin to bear the burden of more than the most featherweight generalizations. Moreover, the dangers of inaccuracy are very great. The defect of thinness is well illustrated in this particular case by the material dealing with the Soviet Union, which is too sketchy to provide any kind of useful picture. A combination of both dangers is apparent on page 71, where the author states that the single transferable vote is used in Tasmania and in the upper houses of the Commonwealth and of New South Wales. To equate these three instances is quite misleading, and in the case of the Commonwealth it is actually wrong because of the use of the list system, which is dealt with in another chapter of Professor Mackenzie's book. Although errors of fact may be remediable, and no doubt a second edition will take care of most of them, the possibilities of misinterpretation through excessive brevity are so great as to be almost ineradicable.

It is nevertheless true that, as the author remarks, no works of a general character exist in this field, and Professor Mackenzie's clarity, brevity, and ease of exposition fit him admirably for the task of filling the gap, even if this is not a wholly successful attempt.

S. Encel

LA CRISE DU SYSTEME DE SECURITE COLLECTIVE DES NATIONS UNIES. *Fernand van Langenhove*. Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, Brussels, and Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1958.

Professor van Langenhove's book *La crise du Système de Sécurité Collective des Nations Unies* is a study of the inherent historical contradictions which led to the breakdown of the original conception of the United Nations at San Francisco and of the efforts of adaptation of the Charter to those contradictions. These result from the hostile postures of the western democracies *vis-à-vis* the Communist world, leading to the present paralysis of the Security Council by virtue of the veto. But when the Council failed, the Assembly developed its influence through the moral force it came to dispose of. The Charter system has come to operate in reverse. It is no longer the Great Powers which keep the peace among the smaller States. The smaller States reduce tensions between the Great Powers through the Assembly, through their regional groupings, and, in the case at least of the 'uncommitted' States, through *ad hoc* negotiations and representations in times of crisis.

Since at the present time amendment to the Charter is not feasible, it has

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been necessary to develop adaptations within its framework. These seek to counterbalance the schism which has denatured the Security Council. These adaptations reflect, too, the important roles of the smaller States in this period of 'atomic stalemate', and of the 'world struggle for the minds of men'. As Professor van Langenhove indicates, they are of four main sorts. First, the Assembly has enhanced its effectiveness and its capability. It has become the arena of psychological warfare and of physical power. It can exert a decisive moral and at times even physical pressure. Its capability has, in its turn, increased the influence of the smaller States. Second, certain structural adaptations have developed which enable the Assembly to undertake its tasks both effectively and promptly. It is true that under the Charter the Assembly has no power to take action; but it has, in effect, gained an authority whereby its members can vindicate its views by taking action in the terms of the resolutions taken in its name. Third, by virtue of the privilege of 'individual or collective self-defence' reserved to the Member States under Article 51, systems of regional collective security have come into being. Professor van Langenhove sees these as 'complementary' to the United Nations. Their complementary nature lies in the fact that these systems, be they regional or universal, are concerned with resisting the expansion of the Soviet Union and of reducing the tension that that expansion engenders. Finally, he sees the General Assembly as an 'umbrella organization' which draws the common functions of the regional organizations together in terms of the 'balance of terror', thereby creating facilities for preventing the final, fatal steps of unleashing atomic warfare.

It is a short book; but it is most thought-provoking for lawyers and laymen alike. Furthermore it is not an unreal study of the Charter's provisions in terms of some *mundus fabulosus*. Rather it seeks to weigh those provisions in terms of social values under the rubric of 'effectiveness', and to analyse their operational ambit in maintaining world peace. This book is a subtle and sensitive study of the Charter in terms of power relations, of feasibility, and of process and function. Its stimulating contents deserve a thorough reading.

L. F. E. Goldie

QUADRANT 10

AUTUMN 1959

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